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The Limits of Child Pornography 
CARISSA BYRNE HESSICK∗ 
Although the First Amendment ordinarily protects the creation, distribution, and 
possession of visual images, the Supreme Court has declared that those protections 
do not apply to child pornography. But the Court has failed to clearly define child 
pornography as a category of speech. Providing a precise definition of the child 
pornography exception to the First Amendment has become increasingly important 
because recent years have seen a dramatic increase in the penalties associated 
with the creation, distribution, and possession of child pornography. 
This Article proposes a clear definition of the child pornography exception. It 
argues that an image ought to fall within the exception only if a child was sexually 
exploited or abused in the creation of the image. That the circulation of an image 
might inflict privacy or reputational harm on the minor depicted should be 
insufficient to categorize that image as child pornography for constitutional 
purposes. This proposed definition would place concrete limits on child 
pornography prosecutions; it would also prevent prosecution in many cases in 
which the minor depicted is above the age of consent, the image was created 
through computer morphing, or the image is the result of surreptitious filming or 
photographing of a minor. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, a fourteen-year-old New Jersey girl posted pictures of herself on 
MySpace.com. She did so because she wanted her boyfriend to see them. But these 
were not ordinary pictures: the girl posted nude photographs of herself, which were 
later described as “very explicit.”1  
John Hotaling altered a pornographic image of an adult couple engaging in 
sexual intercourse. He altered the image by digitally “cutting” the head and neck of 
an underage girl from a photograph that his daughter had taken and “pasting” the 
head and neck onto the image of the adult female engaged in intercourse. Hotaling 
never shared this image with anyone else, nor is there any evidence that he ever 
engaged in any inappropriate conduct with the girl depicted.2  
Donna Zauner took sexually explicit pictures of her two-year-old and 
six-year-old daughters. Then she sent them to a man she knew had sexually 
molested children in the past.3 
Although most people would perceive a real difference in the harm caused and 
the individual blameworthiness displayed in these three stories, current 
constitutional law and prosecutorial practice do not distinguish between the images 
that these three individuals created. All three of these defendants were charged with 
violating child pornography laws.4  
States and the federal government have steadily increased the penalties 
associated with child pornography. The punishment for the possession of child 
pornography now equals or exceeds the penalties for many other serious crimes.5 
For example, a federal defendant found guilty of possessing twenty images of child 
pornography will receive a longer prison sentence than federal defendants who 
committed arson, burglary, robbery, or sexual abuse of a minor.6 The states have 
also steadily increased criminal sentences for possession of child pornography; 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Girl Posts Nude Pics, Is Charged with Kid Porn, NBCNEWS.COM, Mar. 27, 2009, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29912729. 
 2. United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 727 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 3. United States v. Zauner, 688 F.3d 426, 428 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 4. Each defendant could have been charged with and convicted of producing child 
pornography. The decisions not to seek a conviction for production of child pornography but 
to instead bring charges for possession and/or distribution in some of the cases appear to 
have been driven by plea-bargaining considerations. 
 5. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex Abuse, 88 
WASH. U. L. REV. 853, 856–64 (2011). 
 6. This comparison assumes a base offense level of eighteen for possession of child 
pornography, plus a two-level increase for use of a computer and a two-level increase for the 
number of images. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (2013). It does not 
assume any adjustments to the base levels for the other offenses. Id. § 2A3.2 (sexual abuse 
of a minor, base offense level eighteen); id. § 2B2.1(a)(1) (burglary of a residence, base 
offense level seventeen); id. § 2B3.1 (robbery, base offense level twenty); id. § 2K1.4(a)(2) 
(arson, base offense level twenty). 
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those increases have sometimes resulted in the imposition of sentences that are 
longer than those imposed on defendants who sexually assaulted children.7 
Perhaps because of the lengthy sentences at their disposal, prosecutors across 
the country have used child pornography laws to reach behavior that falls well 
outside the boundaries of what is ordinarily perceived as child pornography.8 The 
most visible of these cases involve arrests and prosecutions of teenagers for 
creating and sharing pornographic images of themselves, a practice often referred 
to as “sexting.”9  
A number of commentators have criticized aggressive law enforcement practices 
in sexting cases. They have argued that these practices are contrary to legislative 
intent because minors are being prosecuted under laws meant to protect them,10 that 
sexting is a matter best handled by parents or schools rather than the justice 
system,11 that child pornography penalties are disproportionate to the wrongdoing 
of sexting,12 and that minors cannot appreciate the consequences of their actions.13 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. Hessick, supra note 5, at 857–62. 
 8. See, e.g., Erica Goode, Michigan Town Is Divided over Charges of Child 
Pornography, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2011, at A12 (recounting how an individual was arrested 
and charged with manufacturing and distributing child pornography based on his editing of a 
video to make it appear as though children were listening to him sing a song with graphic 
sexual lyrics). 
 9. See, e.g., Emily Shaaya, States Address the Disconnect: Teens in a Sext-Crazed 
Culture, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2012, at 19–21 (collecting cases); Editorial, ‘Sexting’ 
Overreach, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 28, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com
/layout/set/r14/Commentary/the-monitors-view/2009/0428/p08s03-comv.html (“At least 20 
prosecutions have been undertaken or threatened in recent months—some involving criminal 
child-pornography laws that could list convicted teens as sex offenders.”). 
 10. E.g., Julia Halloran McLaughlin, Exploring the First Amendment Rights of Teens in 
Relationship to Sexting and Censorship, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 315, 324–25 (2012) 
(discussing sexting and legislative intent); Julia Saladino, Hold the Phone: The Incongruity 
of Prosecuting Sexting Teenagers Under the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End 
Exploitation of Children Act of 2003, 10 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 317, 328 (2011) 
(arguing that prosecuting teen sexting as child pornography is inconsistent with 
congressional intent). 
 11. E.g., Bethany L. Arliss, Comment, Sext Me L8ter: The Legal Conundrum of Sexting 
in Schools and a Plan for Schools to Stop It, 20 BUFF. J. GENDER L. & SOC. POL’Y 69, 86 
(2012) (discussing sexting as a policy issue for schools); Jamie L. Williams, Note, Teens, 
Sexts, & Cyberspace: The Constitutional Implications of Current Sexting & Cyberbullying 
Laws, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1017, 1045–49 (2012) (discussing sexting as a policy 
issue best addressed by cooperation between schools and parents). 
 12. E.g., David A. Bosak, Note, The Blurring Line Between Victim and Offender: 
Self-Produced Child Pornography and the Need for Sentencing Reform, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 
141, 156–57 (2012); Andrea Erwin Potter, Schwab Essay, Sexting and Louisiana’s 
Punishment for the Children the Law Intends to Protect from Prosecution Under Child 
Pornography Statutes, 45 FAM. L.Q. 419, 426–27 (2011). 
 13. See, e.g., Maryam F. Mujahid, Note, Romeo and Juliet—A Tragedy of Love by Text: 
Why Targeted Penalties That Offer Front-End Severity and Back-End Leniency Are 
Necessary to Remedy the Teenage Mass-Sexting Dilemma, 55 HOW. L.J. 173, 196–202 
(2011) (discussing the teenage brain and the immaturity of sexters); Potter, supra note 12, at 
427–29 (arguing that children lack the capacity to understand the implications of sexting). 
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Some commentators have argued that criminal prosecutions for teen sexting raise 
First Amendment issues.14 
This Article addresses the expansive scope and enforcement of child 
pornography laws, not only in the limited context of sexting but also in a number of 
other factual scenarios where the pornographic image is not the product of child sex 
abuse or exploitation. It argues that, by enacting expansive child pornography 
prohibitions and prosecuting cases in which there is no abuse or exploitation, 
legislators and prosecutors have impermissibly expanded the category of child 
pornography beyond its constitutional limits.15 
While states are generally free to criminalize and punish most behavior, state 
actors seeking to punish individuals for the creation, distribution, or possession of 
images must do so in a way that is consistent with the First Amendment right to 
free speech. An individual’s free speech right is far from absolute. The Supreme 
Court has recognized several categorical exceptions to the First Amendment’s 
coverage,16 including exceptions for obscenity and for child pornography. If an 
image constitutes child pornography, its creation, distribution, and possession may 
be outlawed. If an image is not child pornography, then those who create, 
distribute, or possess it may be entitled to First Amendment protection. Put 
differently, how the courts choose to define child pornography is also how the 
courts define the boundaries of the child pornography exception to the First 
Amendment.17 Because it is the status of the image—that is, whether an image is or 
is not child pornography—that determines constitutional protection,18 how to 
define the category of child pornography is of surpassing importance.  
Unfortunately, the Court has not placed clear limits on what constitutes child 
pornography,19 and legal scholars have largely failed to fill the gap.20 This Article 
                                                                                                                 
 
 14. E.g., John A. Humbach, ‘Sexting’ and the First Amendment, 37 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 433, 454–56 (2010); Antonio M. Haynes, Note, The Age of Consent: When Is Sexting 
No Longer “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct”?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 388–90 
(2012); Joseph Paravecchia, Note, Sexting and Subsidiarity: How Increased Participation 
and Education from Private Entities May Deter the Production, Distribution, and Possession 
of Child Pornography Among Minors, 10 AVE MARIA L. REV. 235, 242–48 (2011); 
Williams, supra note 11, at 1042–43. 
 15. Cf. Rosalind E. Bell, Note, Reconciling the PROTECT Act with the First 
Amendment, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1878, 1883–84 (2012) (“[P]ost-Ferber child pornography 
regulation and court decisions interpreting this regulation have become untethered from the 
Supreme Court’s crucial limiting interest in protecting children from physical and emotional harm.”). 
 16. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010). 
 17. Because the limits of the child pornography definition are coterminous with the 
limits of the First Amendment exception for child pornography, this Article uses the terms 
“child pornography” and “child pornography exception” interchangeably. 
 18. Cf. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1774–75 (2004) (making a 
similar observation about obscenity). 
 19. See infra note 87. 
 20. See Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 
210 n.5 (2001) [hereinafter Adler, Perverse Law] (“Compared to other areas of First 
Amendment law, child pornography has been largely unexamined.”). Amy Adler is a notable 
exception to the general failure of legal commentators to address the definitional limits of 
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aims to fill that void by articulating a clear definition of what constitutes child 
pornography that would place firm limits on prosecutorial power to charge 
individuals with child pornography offenses. This Article proposes that child 
pornography ought to be defined to include only those images created through the 
sexual exploitation or abuse of a child. If an image was not the product of 
exploitation or abuse, that image should not be characterized as child pornography, 
and First Amendment protections may apply.21 Sexual exploitation and abuse 
include forcible sexual contact and any other sexual activity that is the product of 
either coercion or a lack of consent. 
Limiting child pornography to those images which are the product of 
exploitation and abuse which occurs during creation is consistent with the 
rationales underlying the exception. The child pornography exception is a unique 
First Amendment doctrine in that it criminalizes purely private speech—that is, it 
permits the criminalization of private possession of images in the home, without 
more.22 Such a restrictive speech policy ought to be permitted only when necessary 
to avoid a significant and serious harm. The protection of children from sexual 
abuse and exploitation fits that bill. What is more, because the proposed definition 
incorporates the concept of exploitation—a concept that often distinguishes 
between children and adults—it provides support for the different treatment of 
sexually explicit images based on the age of the person depicted: images of adults 
                                                                                                                 
child pornography. See Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 921 
(2001) [hereinafter Adler, Inverting]; Adler, Perverse Law, supra. 
 21. That an image is not the product of sexual exploitation or abuse does not mean the 
state lacks all authority to regulate its production, distribution, or possession. It does mean 
that such an image should not be classified as child pornography—a category that is fully 
exempt from First Amendment coverage. But such an image may fall within other First 
Amendment exceptions.  
 22. This is not the case with obscenity. Private possession of obscenity is protected. See 
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Nor do other First Amendment doctrines appear to 
permit the regulation of truly private speech; the Court’s other First Amendment exceptions 
all seem to contemplate a speaker and a listener. Those exceptions include defamation, fraud, 
incitement, speech integral to criminal conduct, “fighting words,” “true threats,” disclosure 
of state secrets, and offers or solicitations to engage in illegal activity. See United States v. 
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584–85 (2010); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 
(2008); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 
U.S. 713, 737–40 (1971) (White, J., concurring); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 
(1971). In other words, speech by a single person in a private setting with no audience is, 
outside of the child pornography context, protected. 
  To be clear, the Court in Stanley expressly declined to express “any opinion on 
statutes making criminal possession of other types of printed, filmed, or recorded materials,” 
and it cited a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 793(d), “which makes criminal the otherwise lawful 
possession of materials which ‘the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the 
injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.’” 394 U.S. at 568 n.11. 
The Court noted that “compelling reasons may exist for overriding the right of the individual 
to possess those materials.” Id. Criminal prohibitions for possessing materials, where that 
possession poses “a clear and present danger to national security,” Claudia Tuchman, Note, 
Does Privacy Have Four Walls? Salvaging Stanley v. Georgia, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2267, 
2289 n.149 (1994), are consistent with First Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., Schenck v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
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are subject to the rules for obscenity, while images of children are subject to the 
rules for child pornography. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines current doctrine. It describes 
the Supreme Court’s child pornography cases and identifies what guidance those 
cases provide in limiting the category of child pornography. Those cases indicate 
that the child pornography exception is based on the state interest in protecting the 
physical and emotional well-being of minors. As Part I explains, that well-being is 
harmed by the manner in which child pornography is produced—that is, the sexual 
exploitation and abuse of the child that occurs when the image is created. Children 
also suffer reputational and privacy harms in the subsequent circulation of the 
images. The state protects children by criminalizing the creation, distribution, and 
possession of child pornography, which shuts down the distribution network of and 
dries up the market for such images.  
Part II proposes a definition of child pornography—namely, that the defining 
characteristic of child pornography is the existence of sexual exploitation or abuse 
in the creation of an image. This limited definition is appropriate because (1) it 
reflects the fact that sexual exploitation and abuse are the principal harms 
associated with child pornography, (2) it best justifies the special doctrines 
associated with child pornography, and (3) it does not conflict with other First 
Amendment doctrines. After setting forth the proposed definition, Part II then 
demonstrates why it is superior to several alternative definitions. 
Part III applies the proposed definition to a series of factual scenarios. In 
particular, it applies the proposed definition to situations in which the minor 
depicted is above the age of consent, the image was created through the process of 
computer morphing, or the image was the product of surreptitious filming or 
photographing. In each of these situations, the image is not the product of sexual 
exploitation or abuse; thus, the image falls outside the constitutional limits of child 
pornography. These factual scenarios illustrate the significant differences between 
my proposed definition and the alternative definitions proposed in the academic 
literature and employed by lower courts. The scenarios also demonstrate that, 
although the proposed definition results in some outcomes that seem intuitively 
correct, other outcomes likely conflict with our intuitions. In other words, this Part 
argues that principles should trump intuition in order to provide clear limits for the 
category of child pornography. 
As Part III notes, the mere fact that images do not fall within the limits of child 
pornography does not mean the images are protected First Amendment speech. 
Someone who, for example, surreptitiously films a child in the shower could be 
prosecuted under statutes aimed at video voyeurism, or he could be subject to civil 
liability for invasion of privacy. And teen sexting photographs might be regulable 
as obscenity. In other words, the child pornography exception may not be the only 
First Amendment doctrine that would allow the state to regulate the creation and 
distribution of these images. 
But the mere fact that an image could be regulated under another First 
Amendment exception does not transform the question of child pornography’s 
limits into an academic exercise. Whether an image is appropriately classified as 
child pornography is not simply a matter of labels. Whether an image falls within 
the constitutional category of child pornography has important, real-world effects. 
That is because the Supreme Court’s child pornography doctrines allow states to 
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prohibit and regulate child pornography to a greater extent than other speech. For 
example, while the state may criminalize the private possession of child 
pornography, it may not do so for materials that are merely obscene. Put simply, 
identifying the limits of the child pornography exception is necessary to ensure that 
First Amendment rights are fully protected. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S GUIDANCE ON CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
Ordinarily, the First Amendment protects sexually explicit speech and images 
unless they are “obscene,”23 and the private possession of pornographic images, 
even if obscene, is also protected.24 But beginning with its 1982 decision in New 
York v. Ferber,25 the Supreme Court recognized a new categorical exception to the 
First Amendment—child pornography. Since that time, the Court has decided a 
series of cases developing and refining that exception, which provides less 
protection than the obscenity doctrine. Despite its decision to treat child 
pornography differently than obscenity, the Supreme Court has never provided a 
definitive meaning for the term “child pornography.” This Part describes the 
Supreme Court’s child pornography decisions—New York v. Ferber, Osborne v. 
Ohio, and Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition—highlighting the guidance each of 
these cases provides regarding the definition of child pornography. 
Although failing to provide a clear definition of child pornography, the Court 
has consistently emphasized the state’s interest in preventing harm to children 
caused by (1) the creation and (2) the circulation of the images. According to the 
Court, these state interests in protecting children trump the weak interest of 
individuals in creating, distributing, and possessing such images. But the Court has 
not made clear whether the harm of circulation, standing alone, is sufficient to 
justify the exception for child pornography.26 Instead, its decisions have offered 
conflicting analyses.  
A. New York v. Ferber 
Much of the Court’s guidance regarding the limits of child pornography can be 
drawn from the case that first recognized the First Amendment exception for child 
pornography, New York v. Ferber.27 Paul Ferber, a bookstore owner, had been 
convicted under a New York statute that prohibited the knowing promotion of a 
sexual performance by a child under the age of sixteen.28 Ferber was convicted for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see also Adler, Inverting, supra note 
20, at 929. 
 24. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568. 
 25. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
 26. See Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 
SUP. CT. REV. 285, 291; The Supreme Court, 1981 Term—Child Pornography and 
Unprotected Speech, 96 HARV. L. REV. 141, 143 n.16 (1982) [hereinafter The Supreme 
Court, 1981 Term]. 
 27. 458 U.S. at 747. 
 28. Id. at 749. 
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selling two films “depicting two young boys masturbating.”29 Ferber argued that 
the films were protected by the First Amendment because a jury had found the 
films were not obscene.30 The Court rejected the argument, concluding that child 
pornography falls outside the First Amendment regardless whether it is obscene.  
The Court identified the two major harms to children caused by child 
pornography: the harm of creation and the harm of circulation.31 The first harm is 
the physical and psychological harm that a child experiences in the process of 
creating child pornography.32 In discussing this harm of creation, the Ferber Court 
explained that the production of child pornography involves the sexual exploitation 
and abuse of children. Citing legislative and academic materials,33 the Court 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. Id. at 752. 
 30. Because a jury acquitted Ferber on charges under a statute requiring a finding of 
obscenity and convicted him only of charges under a statute that did not require proof that 
the films were obscene, the case squarely raised the issue whether child pornography must 
be obscene in order for a state to criminalize it. Id. 
 31. The Ferber Court framed its analysis in terms of five justifications, but those 
justifications are overlapping and duplicative. The Ferber Court’s first justification was 
framed in terms of the state’s “interest in ‘safeguarding the physical and psychological 
well-being of a minor,’” which the Court noted was “compelling.” Id. at 756–57 (quoting 
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)). In discussing this 
interest, the Court made clear that this interest included the harm to children caused both by 
creation and by circulation. See id. at 757 (“The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse 
of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance.”); id. at 758 (“[T]he 
use of children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, 
and mental health of the child.”); id. at 758 n.9 (noting the “[s]exual molestation” of children 
by adults that is “often involved” in the creation of child pornography, as well as the invasion 
of “the child’s privacy interests” when sexual performances are recorded and distributed). 
 The Ferber Court’s second justification for classifying all child pornography as not  
covered by the First Amendment also focused on the particular harm of child sex 
exploitation; specifically, it focused on the intrinsic relationship between the distribution of 
child pornography and child sex exploitation and abuse. Id. at 759. 
 The third and fourth justifications rely on analysis from the first two justifications.  
The third Ferber justification is that the distribution of child pornography provides an 
economic motive for the creation of child pornography, and thus distribution is “an integral 
part of the production of such materials, an activity illegal throughout the Nation.” Id. at 761. 
This is essentially a restatement of the second justification. The fourth Ferber justification is 
that the value of permitting the creation of images using “live performances and 
photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly 
modest, if not de minimis.” Id. at 762. This is the other half of the balancing test undertaken 
by the Court in its first justification. 
The fifth Ferber justification is essentially the explicit balancing of interests, as well  
as a statement that denying First Amendment coverage to child pornography is “not 
incompatible” with the Court’s previous decisions. Id. at 763–64. 
 32. Id. at 758 (“[T]he use of children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to 
the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child.”); id. at 764 (“When a definable 
class of material . . . bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in 
its production, we think the balance of competing interests is clearly struck and that it is 
permissible to consider these materials as without the protection of the First Amendment.”). 
 33. See id. at 758 n.9 (collecting sources). 
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stressed that creating child pornography involves “exploitation”34 and often 
involves “[s]exual molestation” of children by adults.35 
The importance of protecting children from the sexual exploitation and abuse 
during the creation of these images can be seen throughout the opinion. For example, 
the Court framed the harms of child pornography in terms of an intrinsic relationship 
between the distribution of child pornography and child sex exploitation and abuse.36 
This relationship led the Court to conclude that the only effective way to end the 
harm of creation was to shut down the distribution network of child pornography.37 
The harm of creation also led the Court to reject the argument that the child 
pornography exception should be limited to images that are obscene. The Court 
observed that whether an image is obscene does not necessarily indicate “whether a 
child has been physically or psychologically harmed in the production of the 
work”—that is, whether an image “required the sexual exploitation of a child for its 
production.”38  
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Ferber also focused on the centrality of 
the harm of creation. She noted that the New York statute at issue targeted “sexual 
exploitation and abuse.”39 She distinguished sexual exploitation and abuse from 
“clinical pictures of adolescent sexuality, such as those that might appear in medical 
textbooks,” as well as from “pictures of children engaged in rites widely approved by 
their cultures, such as those that might appear in issues of the National Geographic.”40 
The second harm identified in Ferber is the harm children suffer by the 
circulation of pornographic images. The Court noted that “the materials produced 
are a permanent record of the children’s participation [in sexual activity] and the 
harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation.”41 The Court suggested that 
closing the distribution network was equally as important as preventing sexual 
abuse and exploitation during creation, if not more so.42 
According to the Ferber Court, the state’s interest in preventing these two harms 
vastly outweighed the “exceedingly modest, if not de minimis” value of permitting 
the creation and distribution of images using “live performances and photographic 
reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct.”43 But in so holding, 
Ferber indicated that the state’s interest in protecting children would not always 
                                                                                                                 
 
 34. Id. at 757 (citing New York legislature). 
 35. Id. at 758 n.9. 
 36. Id. at 759. 
 37. “[T]he distribution network for child pornography must be closed if the production 
of material which requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively controlled.” Id. 
 38. Id. at 761. 
 39. Id. at 775 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also id. (“[T]he statute attempts to protect 
minors from abuse.”). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 759 (majority opinion). 
 42. Id. at 759 n.10 (“[P]ornography poses an even greater threat to the child victim than 
does sexual abuse or prostitution.” (alteration in original) (quoting David P. Shouvlin, 
Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535, 
545 (1981))). 
 43. Id. at 762–64 (emphasis in original). 
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exceed the interest in expression. It explained that the exception for child 
pornography is limited to visual depictions.44 
B. Osborne v. Ohio 
Preventing both the harm of creation and the harm of circulation underlay the 
Court’s next child pornography case, Osborne v. Ohio.45 Osborne had been 
convicted under a state statute that prohibited the private possession of child 
pornography.46 Osborne argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it 
conflicted with the Supreme Court’s decision in Stanley v. Georgia.47 Stanley had 
struck down a state law outlawing the private possession of obscene material. 
The Supreme Court rejected Osborne’s argument. As in Ferber, the Court 
explained that the process of creating child pornography harmed the child. 
Prohibiting possession would dry up the market, resulting in fewer images created 
and thus less exploitation and abuse of children.48 The Court also noted the harm 
caused by circulation.49 It explained that prohibiting private possession would 
“encourage[] the possessors of these materials to destroy them.”50 
In the Court’s view, the interest in preventing these harms to children justified 
different treatment for private possession of child pornography and private 
possession of obscenity. The Court explained that the State had only “weak 
interests” in prohibiting the private possession of ordinary obscenity,51 but that the 
interests of the State in prohibiting child pornography “far exceed the interests 
justifying the Georgia law at issue in Stanley.”52 
The Osborne Court also identified a third harm that was not mentioned in 
Ferber. The Osborne Court stated that prohibiting possession of child pornography 
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. Id. at 764 (“[T]he nature of the harm to be combated requires that the state offense 
be limited to works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a certain age.” 
(emphasis in original)); see also id. at 764–65 (“We note that the distribution of descriptions 
or other depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise obscene, which do not involve live 
performance or photographic or other visual reproduction of live performances, retains First 
Amendment protection.”). 
 45. 495 U.S. 103 (1990). 
 46. Id. at 106–07. 
 47. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
 48. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109–10. Osborne explicitly relied on Ferber for this argument 
and extended the logic from distribution to “all levels in the distribution chain,” including 
possession. Id. at 110. Such an extension was necessary, the Court explained, because, 
according to Ohio, “much of the child pornography market has been driven underground; as 
a result, it is now difficult, if not impossible, to solve the child pornography problem by only 
attacking production and distribution.” Id. 
 49. Id. at 111 (“[T]he materials produced by child pornographers permanently record 
the victim’s abuse [causing] the child victims continuing harm by haunting the children in 
years to come.” (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982))). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 109–10 (citing Stanley, 394 U.S. at 567–68); see also id. at 108 (characterizing 
the interest in “permitting child pornography” as “exceedingly modest, if not de minimis” 
(quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762)). 
 52. Id. at 108. 
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could help to protect future victims of child sex abuse, not just those children 
depicted in child pornography. The Court based this conclusion on sources 
suggesting that “pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other children into 
sexual activity.”53 This new argument in favor of the exemption of child 
pornography from First Amendment protection is significant because it suggests 
that the compelling interest in protecting children is not limited to the abuse and 
exploitation in the creation of such images; abuse and exploitation can also arise at 
a later date from the mere existence of such images.54 In Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition, however, the Court clarified that the interest in protecting future victims 
of child sex abuse, rather than those children victimized by the creation of child 
pornography, was insufficient to outweigh the individual interests at stake.55  
C. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition 
Although the Court invoked both the harm of creation and the harm of 
circulation in Ferber and Osborne, it did not state in those cases whether either 
harm, standing alone, justified the child pornography exception. In the 2002 
decision Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,56 however, the Court indicated that the 
harm of creation—that is, the sexual exploitation and abuse of children to produce 
child pornography—plays a principal, if not the primary, role in its child 
pornography doctrine. 
Free Speech Coalition involved a First Amendment challenge to the Child 
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, which outlawed virtual child pornography —
that is, pornographic images created wholly by technological means—and any 
other “visual depiction” that “is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct.”57 The Court concluded that the statute was unconstitutional, 
explaining that virtual child pornography fell outside the constitutional category of 
child pornography.58 
In so holding, the Free Speech Coalition Court explicitly rejected the new harm 
identified in Osborne—protecting future victims of child sex abuse, not just those 
                                                                                                                 
 
 53. Id. at 111. 
 54. See, e.g., Mary Graw Leary, Self-Produced Child Pornography: The Appropriate 
Societal Response to Juvenile Self-Sexual Exploitation, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 39–41 
(2007) (stating that “child molesters” use sexting to “groom children to participate in sexual 
conduct,” that such use may justify prosecution of teen sexting even when teens create the 
images without exploitation, and that the harm associated with grooming is “not diminished” 
merely when the image is self-created).  
 55. See infra note 59. 
 56. 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
 57. Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 
3009, invalidated by Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234. 
 58. 535 U.S. at 240 (“The principal question to be resolved, then, is whether the CPPA 
is constitutional where it proscribes a significant universe of speech that is neither obscene 
under Miller nor child pornography under Ferber.”); id. at 245–46 (“The freedom of speech 
has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of speech, including defamation, 
incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real children. . . . While these 
categories may be prohibited without violating the First Amendment, none of them includes 
the speech prohibited by the CPPA.”). 
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children victimized by the creation of child pornography—as a government interest 
sufficient to outweigh the individual interests at stake.59 The Free Speech Coalition 
Court also left no doubt that the harm of creation—that is, the sexual exploitation 
and abuse of children to produce child pornography—is the touchstone of its child 
pornography doctrine. It noted that its analysis in previous cases about the state 
interests outweighing private interests “was based upon how [an image] was made, 
not on what it communicated.”60 Thus, Free Speech Coalition leaves no doubt that 
the harm of creation, standing alone, is sufficient to overcome the individual 
interests at stake. 
At the same time, however, Free Speech Coalition did not resolve whether the 
harm of circulation, standing alone, justifies the child pornography exception. The 
sufficiency of the harm of circulation arose in the Court’s discussion of computer 
morphing, the process of creating sexually explicit images of children by 
“alter[ing] innocent pictures of real children so that the children appear to be 
engaged in sexual activity.”61 Because the respondents had not challenged the 
statutory provision prohibiting morphed computer images, the Court explicitly 
declined to address whether such images fell within the category of child 
pornography. The Court did, however, note that morphed images “implicate the 
interests of real children and are in that sense closer to the images in Ferber.”62 A 
child who is the subject of a morphed computer image cannot demonstrate that he 
or she suffered the harm of sex abuse or exploitation in the creation of the image. 
He or she could, however, suffer mental or emotional anguish from the knowledge 
or fear that such images have been circulated. By declining to address this 
provision, and by noting that those images were “closer” to the images in Ferber 
than were virtual images, the Court left open the possibility that the harm of 
circulation, standing alone, might be sufficient to deprive an image of First 
Amendment protection. 
Free Speech Coalition thus left open the question whether child pornography 
includes any sexually explicit depiction of real children or only those sexually 
explicit images created through exploiting or abusing children. To be sure, parts of 
the opinion describe child pornography as any sexually explicit images produced 
using real children.63 At other times, however, the opinion uses language that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 59. See id. at 250 (noting that the Osborne opinion had identified a government interest 
“in preventing child pornography from being used as an aid in the solicitation of minors,” 
but stating that the Osborne Court had “anchored its holding in the concern for the 
participants” and “did not suggest that, absent this concern, other governmental interests 
would suffice”). The Court also rejected the government’s argument that “virtual child 
pornography whets the appetites of pedophiles and encourages them to engage in illegal 
conduct,” observing that “[t]he mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a 
sufficient reason for banning it.” Id. at 253. 
 60. Id. at 250–51. 
 61. Id. at 242. 
 62. Id.  
 63. See id. at 245–46 (“The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain 
categories of speech, including . . . pornography produced with real children.”); id. at 241 
(“Before 1996, Congress defined child pornography as the type of depictions at issue in 
Ferber, images made using actual minors.”). 
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appears to restrict child pornography to only those images created by harming (that 
is, sexually exploiting or abusing) children in the production of the images.64 
Indeed, the opinion sometimes switches between these alternative descriptions 
in the same paragraph or even the same sentence.65  
Finally, although the Free Speech Coalition Court did not expressly define child 
pornography, it rejected the argument that nonexploitative images can be forbidden 
as child pornography simply because they may be indistinguishable from 
exploitative images. The government had argued that experts would have 
“difficulty in saying whether the pictures were made by using real children or by 
using computer imaging.”66 The Court was unpersuaded by this argument. The 
First Amendment, according to the Free Speech Coalition Court, does not allow the 
government to “suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech.” 
Rather, the First Amendment “requires the reverse. ‘[T]he possible harm to society 
                                                                                                                 
 
 64. See id. at 251 (characterizing Ferber as “reaffirm[ing] that where the speech is 
neither obscene nor the product of sexual abuse, it does not fall outside the protection of the 
First Amendment.”); id. at 249 (“Where the images are themselves the product of child 
sexual abuse, Ferber recognized that the State had an interest in stamping it out without 
regard to any judgment about its content. The production of the work, not its content, was 
the target of the statute.” (citations omitted)); id. at 250–51 (“Ferber’s judgment about child 
pornography was based upon how it was made, not on what it communicated.”); id. at 250 
(“In contrast to the speech in Ferber, speech that itself is the record of sexual abuse, the 
CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime and creates no victims by its production.”); id. 
at 249 (“Ferber upheld a prohibition on the distribution and sale of child pornography, as 
well as its production, because these acts were ‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of 
children . . . .”); id. at 250 (“Virtual child pornography is not ‘intrinsically related’ to the 
sexual abuse of children, as were the materials in Ferber. While the Government asserts that 
the images can lead to actual instances of child abuse, the causal link is contingent and 
indirect. The harm does not necessarily follow from the speech, but depends upon some 
unquantified potential for subsequent criminal acts.” (citations omitted)); id. at 254 (“In the 
case of the material covered by Ferber, the creation of the speech is itself the crime of child 
abuse; the prohibition deters the crime by removing the profit motive.”); see also id. at 244 
(“The sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral 
instincts of a decent people.”). 
 65. See, e.g., id. at 240 (“By prohibiting child pornography that does not depict an actual 
child, the statute goes beyond New York v. Ferber, which distinguished child pornography 
from other sexually explicit speech because of the State’s interest in protecting the children 
exploited by the production process.” (citation omitted)). 
  Another example can be found in Free Speech Coalition’s discussion of the CPPA’s 
affirmative defense. That defense allowed “a defendant to avoid conviction for 
nonpossession offenses by showing that the materials were produced using only adults and 
were not otherwise distributed in a manner conveying the impression that they depicted real 
children.” Id. at 255. The Court stated that the affirmative defense was “incomplete and 
insufficient” because it allowed “persons to be convicted in some instances where they can 
prove children were not exploited in the production” of an image. Id. at 256. But the Court 
further criticized the affirmative defense, saying it “cannot save the statute, for it leaves 
unprotected a substantial amount of speech not tied to the Government’s interest in 
distinguishing images produced using real children from virtual ones.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 66. Id. at 254. 
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in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the 
possibility that protected speech of others may be muted . . . .’”67 
D. Other Recent Decisions 
The Supreme Court has offered some further guidance on the definition of child 
pornography in two recent cases, though neither directly implicated the scope of the 
child pornography exception. The first, United States v. Williams,68 addressed 
limitations on “the pandering or solicitation of child pornography.”69 While the 
holding in Williams did not turn on the limits of child pornography,70 language in 
the opinion supports a definition based on the depiction of real children rather than 
a definition limited to images created through exploitation or abuse.71 First, 
Williams stated that the category of child pornography “consists of sexually explicit 
visual portrayals that feature children.”72 Second, the Williams Court characterized 
the decision in Free Speech Coalition as invalidating the prohibition on virtual 
child pornography “because the child-protection rationale for speech restriction 
does not apply to materials produced without children.”73 
Another case that provides some insight into the definition of child pornography 
is United States v. Stevens.74 There, the Supreme Court struck down a federal law 
prohibiting the creation, sale, and possession of videos depicting animal cruelty. 
The Court rejected the government’s argument that categorical exceptions to the 
First Amendment are appropriate when, as a category, “the First Amendment value 
of the speech is ‘clearly outweighed’ by its societal costs.”75 In doing so, the Court 
recharacterized its analysis in Ferber. According to the Stevens Court, Ferber did 
not turn on a “balance of competing interests.”76 Instead, the Court explained, 
Ferber recognized the exception for child pornography because “[t]he market for 
child pornography was ‘intrinsically related’ to the underlying abuse, and was 
therefore ‘an integral part of the production of such materials, an activity illegal 
throughout the Nation.’”77 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. Id. at 255 (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 
U.S. 601, 612 (1973)). 
 68. 553 U.S. 285 (2008). 
 69. Id. at 288. 
 70. See id. at 297–99. 
 71. See, e.g., Mary Graw Leary, Sexting or Self-Produced Child Pornography? The 
Dialog Continues—Structured Prosecutorial Discretion Within a Multidisciplinary 
Response, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 486, 529–30 (2010); Haynes, supra note 14, at 392 
n.181. 
 72. 553 U.S. at 288. 
 73. Id. at 289; see also id. at 293 (characterizing Free Speech Coalition as “stating that 
the First Amendment does not protect obscenity or pornography produced with actual 
children”). 
 74. 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010). 
 75. Brief for the United States at 12, United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) 
(No. 08-769). 
 76. 130 S. Ct. at 1586 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 77. Id. 
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Because Stevens focuses on the underlying abuse in production, the case 
suggests that the harm in creation is the key feature of child pornography. But it is 
difficult to know whether the Stevens Court meant to limit child pornography to 
those images whose production involved illegal sexual exploitation or abuse. After 
all, Ferber, Osborne, and Free Speech Coalition are all written in terms of a 
balancing of interests, and much of the analysis in those opinions is devoted to 
describing and evaluating the government interests at stake. Stevens’s claim that 
balancing did not play a key role in defining child pornography is inconsistent with 
those decisions, and it is unlikely that the Court meant to disavow that line of cases 
so cavalierly in dicta in a case not about child pornography. 
Moreover, the alternative analysis in Stevens is not unambiguous. It 
characterizes the child pornography exception as a subset of the broader “integral 
part” exception, first recognized in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.78 Giboney 
itself did not clearly define the reach of the exception, nor have subsequent cases 
applying Giboney.79 Thus, even if Stevens did intend to limit child pornography to 
those images for which sexual exploitation or abuse played an “integral part” in 
their production, it would not be clear how to apply such a definition. 
II. PROPOSING A NEW DEFINITION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
This Part proposes limiting the definition of child pornography to those images 
created through the sexual exploitation or abuse of children. Sexual exploitation 
and abuse includes forcible sexual contact and any other sexual activity that is the 
product of either coercion or lack of consent. This limited definition is appropriate 
because it isolates the principal harm of child pornography, because it best justifies 
the special doctrines associated with child pornography, and because it is 
compatible with other First Amendment doctrines. The definition is also superior to 
a number of alternative definitions that have been proposed in judicial decisions 
and the academic literature. 
This Part begins by explaining why child pornography is best defined as images 
created through sexual exploitation or abuse. It then considers a number of other 
definitions—including a definition based on whether the circulation of an image 
causes harm, a definition based on whether an image is “an integral part” of a 
course of criminal conduct, and a common lower court definition called the Dost 
test—and it explains why the proposed definition based on exploitation or abuse in 
creation is superior to these alternatives. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 78. 336 U.S. 490 (1949). 
 79. Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of 
Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 
1277, 1326 (2005). 
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A. Defining Child Pornography Based on Harm at Creation 
1. The Centrality of Exploitation or Abuse 
Limiting the definition of child pornography to those images created through the 
sexual exploitation or abuse of children is appropriate because exploitation and 
abuse represent the principal harm of child pornography. That exploitation or abuse 
is the principal harm of child pornography is supported not only by the Court’s 
child pornography cases but also by logic and comparison to other harms. 
As Part I indicated, the Supreme Court’s child pornography cases often discuss 
the state’s interest in preventing the harm to children caused by sexual exploitation 
and abuse in the creation of the image.80 For example, in explaining why the test 
for obscenity from Miller v. California was not the correct test for child 
pornography, the Ferber Court observed that whether an image is obscene does not 
necessarily indicate “whether a child has been physically or psychologically 
harmed in the production of the work”—that is, whether an image “required the 
sexual exploitation of a child for its production.”81  
The strongest indication that sexual exploitation or abuse is the touchstone of 
the Court’s child pornography doctrine can be found in Free Speech Coalition. In 
striking down a statute that prohibited images whose content appeared identical to 
child pornography, the Free Speech Coalition Court stated that it is the harm of 
production, not the content of an image, that defines the category of child 
pornography82: “Ferber’s judgment about child pornography was based upon how 
it was made, not on what it communicated. The case reaffirmed that where the 
speech is neither obscene nor the product of sexual abuse, it does not fall outside 
the protection of the First Amendment.”83 
Even though there is much language in the Court’s opinions supporting a 
limitation of child pornography to those images created through the sexual 
                                                                                                                 
 
 80. “The Court’s child pornography jurisprudence depends on this idea: Child pornography 
is child sexual abuse.” Adler, Perverse Law, supra note 20, at 215 (emphasis in original). 
 81. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982). 
 82. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 241 (2002) (“These images do not 
involve, let alone harm, any children in the production process . . . .”); id. at 242 (“Under 
[congressional] rationales, harm flows from the content of the images, not from the means of 
their production.”); id. at 249 (“Where the images are themselves the product of child sexual 
abuse, Ferber recognized that the State had an interest in stamping it out without regard to 
any judgment about its content. The production of the work, not its content, was the target of 
the statute.” (citation omitted)). 
 83. Id. at 250–51 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764–65). Another example of the centrality 
of sexual exploitation and abuse in production can be found in Free Speech Coalition’s 
discussion of the CPPA’s affirmative defense. That defense allowed “a defendant to avoid 
conviction for nonpossession offenses by showing that the materials were produced using 
only adults and were not otherwise distributed in a manner conveying the impression that 
they depicted real children.” Id. at 255; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (2000) (amended 
2003). The Court stated that the affirmative defense was “incomplete and insufficient” 
because it allowed “persons to be convicted in some instances where they can prove children 
were not exploited in the production” of an image. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 256 
(emphasis added). 
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exploitation or abuse of a child, there is ample language from those cases that 
undercuts such a definition.84 And despite its language about the harm of production 
rather than the content of images driving its child pornography exception, the Free 
Speech Coalition opinion expressly declined to decide whether computer morphing 
could be prohibited as child pornography.85 As explained more fully below, computer 
morphing does not involve child sexual exploitation or abuse.86 
The conflicting language from the Court’s decisions and its failure to offer an 
explicit definition of the child pornography exception87 leave the limits of child 
pornography unclear. Thus, any attempt to define the child pornography category 
may not simply rely on the Court’s cases but must provide independent support for 
a proffered definition. A definition that limits child pornography to images created 
through sexual exploitation or abuse is sensible because it limits child pornography 
according to the principal harm of such images. 
Sexual exploitation and abuse is the principal harm implicated by child 
pornography. The other major harm that can arise from child pornography—the 
harm of circulation—is both lesser than and derivative of the harm of creation.88 
The difference in severity between the harms of creation and circulation is apparent 
                                                                                                                 
 
 84. See supra notes 41–42, 49–50, and 61–65. For example, the Court’s opinion in 
Williams suggested that the First Amendment permitted the prohibition of visual depictions 
of “sexual intercourse that is explicitly portrayed, even though (through camera tricks or 
otherwise) it may not actually have occurred.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 296 
–97 (2008). While it is possible to read this statement so as to include only activity that 
constitutes exploitation or abuse—after all, exploitation and abuse can occur without sexual 
intercourse—the Court’s ambiguous reference to “camera tricks” leaves open the possibility 
of the creation of an image without exploitation or abuse of a child. 
 85. 535 U.S. at 242. 
 86. See infra Part III.B. 
 87. See Adler, Perverse Law, supra note 20, at 234–35 (stating that the Court has taken 
a passive role in defining the limits of child pornography and largely accepted the definition 
of legislatures, creating a “sense of boundlessness in child pornography law”); see also 
Schauer, supra note 26, at 294 (“Curiously, Ferber contains no initial description of the 
category itself . . . .”); The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, supra note 26, at 148 (noting the 
Court’s “contradictory definitions of the bounds of speech left unprotected after Ferber”). 
  While the Supreme Court has failed to provide a clear definition of child 
pornography, the limits of child pornography have been repeatedly addressed by the lower 
courts. See Adler, Perverse Law, supra note 20, at 265 (“In order to prohibit speech, you 
must describe it. Child pornography jurisprudence has thus been largely concerned with 
articulating the limits of the definition of child pornography, beyond which the government 
may not reach.”). The lower courts have embraced a six-factor test, which has been the 
subject of much criticism, and which is discussed infra in Section II.D. 
 88. Indeed, the Ferber opinion suggests as much by characterizing its own harm of 
circulation argument as one way that the distribution of child pornography “is intrinsically 
related to the sexual abuse of children.” 458 U.S. at 759. Similarly, the Osborne Court 
characterized the harm caused by the circulation of child pornography as “continuing harm” 
caused by the images that “permanently record the victim’s abuse” and that “haunt[] the 
children in years to come.” Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990). Further proof of 
centrality of the harm from abuse is the argument from Osborne that “encouraging the 
destruction” of child pornography “is also desirable because evidence suggests that pedophiles 
use child pornography to seduce other children into sexual activity.” Id. 
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from a simple thought experiment: given the choice between suffering a sexual 
assault or having a convincing but fraudulent pornographic image of oneself 
circulated (that is, an image created through digital manipulation and thus not a 
product of sexual exploitation or abuse), it is inconceivable that a person would 
choose the sexual assault.89 The reputational and psychological harm caused by the 
circulation of the image is indisputably less than the physical and psychological 
harm caused by a sexual assault.90  
The harm of circulation is not only less severe than the harm of creation, it is 
also derivative. This is illustrated by the fact that the harm of circulation argument 
is ordinarily framed as a concern that victims are aware that there is a permanent 
record of the abuse that they suffered,91 not the possibility that a person might be 
mistakenly identified as a child abuse victim.92 
Confirming the primacy of the harm of sexual abuse and exploitation is the fact 
that much of the rhetoric regarding the harmfulness of child pornography consists 
essentially of second-order arguments about the harm of child sex abuse—that is, 
punishment is necessary either to stop the production of the pornographic 
materials93 or it is necessary to prevent the consumers of child pornography (who 
                                                                                                                 
 
 89. Hessick, supra note 5, at 869.  
 90. See Audrey Rogers, From Peer-to-Peer Networks to Cloud Computing: How 
Technology Is Redefining Child Pornography Laws, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014) (manuscript at 38), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2006664 (stating that, as compared with producers, distributors of child 
pornography “also harm the child, but typically to a lesser degree because they are not 
involved in any direct sexual abuse of a child”). 
 91. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759; see also Bell, supra note 15, at 1887 (“Pornographic 
materials comprise permanent records of sexual exploitation, exacerbating a child’s original 
injury through their circulation.”). 
 92. But see Annemarie J. Mazzone, Comment, United States v. Knox: Protecting 
Children from Sexual Exploitation Through the Federal Child Pornography Laws, 
5 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 167, 184–85 (1994) (reprinting statement by 
Senator David D. Marriott). 
  Even when the circulation of images publicizes past abuse, there is reason to be 
concerned about overemphasizing the harm of circulation. That is because the harm is premised 
on “the perpetuation of secrecy associated with child sex abuse.” Hessick, supra note 5, at 870. 
Many child sex offenders are able to manipulate their victims into keeping the abuse secret by 
convincing the victims that there will be bad consequences for them if anyone finds out about 
the abuse. The harm of circulation argument taps into this pernicious culture of secrecy by 
perpetuating the idea that allowing others to see pictures of the abuse—that is revealing the 
secret of the abuse—is as bad as or worse than the abuse itself. Id. 
 93. See, e.g., Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108–10; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759–61; Cheryl Hanna 
& Pamela Vesilind, Preview of United States v. Stevens: Animal Law, Obscenity, and the 
Limits of Government Censorship, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 59, 66 (2009) (referencing 
government contention that “outlawing the possession and distribution of child pornography 
decreases actual child exploitation and abuse” (citing Brief for the United States, supra note 
75, at 36–37)). 
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are assumed to be sexually attracted to children) from sexually assaulting children 
later in time.94 
2. Building a Definition 
Having identified sexual exploitation or abuse as the principal harm of child 
pornography, we must now turn to the question of how to incorporate that 
conclusion into a definition of child pornography. Of course, defining child 
pornography as images created through the sexual exploitation or abuse of a child 
is of limited usefulness unless we also define sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. 
Unfortunately, there is no singular definition of those terms. Statutes, dictionaries, 
and academic literature define these terms differently.95 We cannot rely on 
                                                                                                                 
 
 94. See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111; YAMAN AKDENIZ, INTERNET CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
AND THE LAW: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 4–5 (2008); see also Hessick, 
supra note 5, at 871–72 (collecting sources). 
 95. See Adler, Perverse Law, supra note 20, at 219 n.47 (“A consistent definition of sexual 
abuse has yet to arise.”). For example, some authorities have defined sexual exploitation of a 
child as a form of sexual abuse. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8) (2012) (defining “sexual abuse” as 
including “the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to 
engage in . . . sexually explicit conduct or the rape, molestation, prostitution, or other form of 
sexual exploitation of children”); Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 5106g(4) (2006) (defining “sexual abuse” as, inter alia, “statutory rape, molestation, 
prostitution, or other form of sexual exploitation of children”); ROBIN E. CLARK & JUDITH 
FREEMAN CLARK WITH CHRISTINE ADAMEC, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHILD ABUSE 329–38 (3d 
ed. 2007) (identifying Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, and Kansas). Others have 
defined the two terms separately, identifying sexual abuse of a child in terms of sexual assault 
or molestation and identifying sexual exploitation in terms of facilitating or forcing a child to 
engage in prostitution or other sexually explicit conduct. E.g., id. at 329–38 (identifying 
Arkansas, District of Columbia, and Georgia). 
  Many define sexual exploitation as, inter alia, using children in child 
pornography. E.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1407 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “sexual 
exploitation” as “[t]he use of a person, esp. a child, in prostitution, pornography, or other 
sexually manipulative activity that has caused or could cause serious emotional injury”); 
SETH L. GOLDSTEIN, THE SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
ASSESSMENT, INVESTIGATION, AND INTERVENTION 33 (2d ed. 1999) (identifying child 
pornography as one of the three categories of sexual exploitation); Child Sexual 
Exploitation, WYO. DIVISION CRIM. INVESTIGATION, http://wyomingdci.wyo.gov/dci
-operations-section/child-sexual-exploitation (“What is child sexual exploitation? Child 
sexual exploitation can involve the following: Possession, manufacture and distribution of 
child pornography; online enticement of children for sexual acts; child prostitution; child 
sex tourism and; child sexual molestation.”); Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, 
FAQ: Child Sexual Exploitation, MISSINGKIDS.COM, http://www.missingkids.com
/Exploitation/FAQ (stating that child sexual exploitation includes possession, 
manufacture, and distribution of child pornography). Such definitions are obviously of no 
use for our purposes—to define child pornography in terms of sexual exploitation and 
then to define sexual exploitation in terms of child pornography is hopelessly circular. 
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legislative definitions because child pornography is a constitutional category, 
which makes it necessarily independent from legislative policy preferences.96  
The proposed definition contemplates two components of sexual exploitation or 
abuse: (1) sexual activity and (2) the circumstance that renders that activity 
exploitative or abusive. The sexual activity component obviously includes sexual 
molestation—that is, so-called “contact offenses” where there is physical contact 
between a minor and an adult of a sexual nature. Contact offenses include both 
involuntary contact (that is, sexual assaults) and contact for which a minor cannot 
legally consent.  
The sexual activity component also includes sexual activity where there is no 
contact between the victim and another individual.97 Many child pornography 
statutes prohibit depictions of sexual intercourse, bestiality, masturbation, 
sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd or lascivious exhibition of the genitals.98 Sexual 
intercourse and sado-masochistic abuse are necessarily contact offenses, while 
bestiality and masturbation may be noncontact offenses. Lewd or lascivious 
exhibition of the genitals is often a noncontact offense.99 
The circumstance that renders an activity exploitative or abusive is more 
difficult to define than sexual activity. I propose that abuse and exploitation include 
only force, coercion, or lack of consent.100 Some have suggested that the category 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). Indeed, legislatures 
have, at times, deliberately failed to provide clear definitions in child pornography statutes in 
an attempt to keep defendants from exploiting “loopholes” in such definitions. See Mazzone, 
supra note 92, at 185. 
 97. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 n.9 (stating that “[s]exual molestation by 
adults is often involved in the production of” child pornography and thus implying that some 
child pornography is produced in the absence of sexual molestation). 
 98. This is the definition from both the statute at issue in Ferber and the current federal 
statute. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00(1), (3), (4) (McKinney 1980); 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)–
(B) (2012). The Court appears to have affirmed the constitutionality of this definition sub 
silentio in Ferber. 
 99. Lewd or lascivious exhibition of the genitals is difficult to define because, unlike the 
other commonly identified sexual activities, the terms “lewd” and “lascivious” do not have a 
commonly accepted meaning. See Adler, Perverse Law, supra note 20, at 238–41 
(discussing the problems in defining the terms and noting that their meaning has expanded 
steadily). Providing a definition of lewd or lascivious exhibition of the genitals is beyond the 
scope of this Article, which assumes arguendo that some depictions of child nudity constitute 
sexual activity, that some depictions do not, and that courts are competent to distinguish 
between those two categories. 
  I recognize that it may, in fact, be impossible to make such distinctions. As Amy 
Adler has noted, the courts’ willingness to accept lewd or lascivious exhibition of the 
genitals as a category of sexual activity for child pornography purposes “seems to threaten 
all pictures of unclothed children, whether ‘lewd’ or not, and even pictures of clothed 
children, if they meet the increasingly hazy definition of ‘lascivious’ or ‘lewd.’” Adler, 
Inverting, supra note 20, at 947. 
 100. See Weronika Kowalczyk, Note, Abridging Constitutional Rights: Sexting 
Legislation in Ohio, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 685, 703–04 (2010) (noting that “[a]lthough there 
are variations” of the definition of child sex abuse, all the definitions “encompass at least 
two factors: (1) sexual activities involving minors, and (2) ‘an abusive condition, such as 
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ought to include any situation in which a child could suffer emotional injury101 or in 
which the audience derives sexual gratification.102 These two suggestions assess the 
abusive or exploitative circumstances after the fact—that is, after the image has 
already been created and is being viewed. The exploitation or abuse contemplated 
by my proposed definition must occur at the same time the image is created. If the 
sexual gratification of the viewer were our only criterion, then child pornography 
could include wholly innocent images—such as pictures from a Sears catalogue—
which are apparently considered sexually titillating by some individuals.103 And if 
emotional injury were the only criterion, then child pornography could include, for 
example, written descriptions rather than visual depictions.104 
What is more, the exploitation or abuse must exist independently of the actual 
filming or photographing itself. That is to say, the mere fact that an image was 
created is insufficient to demonstrate that the child depicted was abused or 
exploited. One must demonstrate that the child would have been abused or 
exploited even if no image had been captured—for example, because he or she was 
subject to sexual contact or because he or she engaged in noncontact sexual activity 
that was not the product of his or her own free will.  
In sum, sexual exploitation or abuse encompasses (a) sexual contact or 
noncontact sexual activity that is (b) the result of force, coercion, or lack of 
consent. This definition of abuse or exploitation is superior to a definition based on 
whether a child could suffer emotional injury or whether the audience derives 
sexual gratification from the image because those definitions would sweep in 
significant amounts of material that is not pornographic. Thus, it is appropriate to 
limit the definition to some sort of abusive condition—such as force, coercion, or 
lack of consent—at the time the image was created.  
Of course, because children are legally incapable of consenting to sexual 
activity, one might argue that lack of consent does not place any meaningful limits 
on the term sexual exploitation or abuse. That is not accurate. Lack of consent 
contemplates at least two limitations. First, it limits abuse or exploitation to 
situations involving another participant in addition to the minor depicted. The 
concept of consent assumes two actors—the person seeking consent and the person 
giving consent. Thus, a noncontact instance of sexual exploitation or abuse is best 
                                                                                                                 
coercion or lack of consent’” (quoting ROGER J.R. LEVESQUE, SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN: 
A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 151–52 (1999))). 
 101. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-403(1) (West 2013) (justifying the 
prohibition on child pornography based on, inter alia, the fact that “the sexual exploitation of 
children constitutes a wrongful invasion of the child’s right of privacy and results in social, 
developmental, and emotional injury to the child”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 
95, at 1407 (defining “sexual exploitation” as “[t]he use of a person, esp. a child, in 
prostitution, pornography, or other sexually manipulative activity that has caused or could 
cause serious emotional injury”). 
 102. See, e.g., United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d, 813 
F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 103. See infra notes 199–200. 
 104. See infra text accompanying notes 129–30. 
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conceptualized as a minor engaging in sexual activity at the prompting of another 
individual (for example, based on a request or a threat).105 
Second, framing exploitation as a question of consent excludes a number of 
contact and noncontact activities by minors above the age of consent. Although 
child pornography laws prohibit images of minors below the age of eighteen, most 
American jurisdictions set the age of consent for sexual activity below that age.106 
Images that depict sexual activity of minors above the age of consent do not depict 
exploitation or abuse, as defined in this Article, unless the images depict forcible 
sexual contact (that is, a sexual assault) or resulted from coercion. Absent physical 
force or coercion, images depicting minors above the age of consent are not the 
product of exploitation or abuse and thus ought not be deemed child pornography. 
It is important to note that this Article defines the term “exploitation” more 
narrowly than its common usage. Exploitation is a broad term, generally defined as 
“taking advantage of something” or “taking unjust advantage of another for one’s 
own benefit.”107 This broad common understanding of the term has doubtless led 
many to define sexual exploitation to include any sexual depiction of a child.108 In 
adopting a narrower definition of exploitation—the presence of an abusive 
condition, such as force, coercion, or lack of consent—this Article attempts to 
define exploitation in a manner that meaningfully distinguishes between adults and 
children.109 A definition that distinguishes between adults and children seems 
warranted for a doctrine such as child pornography, given that the legal 
ramifications are dramatically different depending on whether the person depicted 
is a child or an adult. 
Finally, some will undoubtedly object to the proposed definition because it will 
interfere with enforcement. That is correct. Most obviously, it will prevent the 
conviction of defendants who possess images that were not created through sexual 
exploitation or abuse of a child. Part III explains how some images—namely, many 
images that depict minors above the age of consent, images that were created 
through computer morphing, and images resulting from surreptitious filming or 
photographing—are not punishable as child pornography under the proposed 
definition. 
In addition to excluding some images from the category of child pornography, 
the proposed definition may make it more difficult to prosecute in cases involving 
images that are the product of abuse or exploitation—namely, images that are 
properly categorized as child pornography, even under the proposed definition. 
That is because defendants will be able to demand that prosecutors prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the images in their case are the product of exploitation or 
abuse. Because the circumstances under which an image is created will not always 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. See Shouvlin, supra note 42, at 537 (defining “sexual exploitation” as “sexual 
activity by a child that is encouraged, promoted, or paid for by an adult”). 
 106. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE 
LAW 1021–22 (1st ed. 1997) (noting that thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia set 
the age of consent at or below sixteen). 
 107. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 619. 
 108. See infra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 109. See infra text accompanying notes 135–39. 
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be clear from an inspection of the image itself, the proposed definition may result 
in fewer convictions than under the present system.110 
Concerns about enforcement problems are not unique to the proposed definition. 
Similar concerns prompted Congress to raise the age for its child pornography 
statutes from sixteen to eighteen in 1984.111 Enforcement concerns also led 
Congress to prohibit virtual child pornography in 1996,112 the prohibition that was 
struck down by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.113 
While enforcement concerns are certainly important, there are at least two 
reasons why such concerns do not undermine the proposed definition. First, as the 
Free Speech Coalition decision explains, enforcement concerns ought not drive 
First Amendment definitions.114 Second, the proposed definition is not the last 
                                                                                                                 
 
 110. The magnitude of this impact is, of course, unknown. It may, however, prove not to 
be particularly great. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition, one might have expected to see a decrease in child pornography convictions 
because prosecutors had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that an image was not virtual 
child pornography. A recent study suggests that the effect of Free Speech Coalition on the 
ability of prosecutors to obtain child pornography convictions has been negligible. See JANIS 
WOLAK, DAVID FINKELHOR & KIMBERLY J. MITCHELL, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSORS 
ARRESTED IN INTERNET-RELATED CRIMES: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL JUVENILE ONLINE 
VICTIMIZATION STUDY 21–25 (2005).  
 111. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-536, at 7–8 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 492, 498 
–99. Prior to that, prosecutors had difficulties obtaining child pornography convictions when 
they could not secure the testimony of the minor depicted in the image unless the age of the 
minor was patently obvious from the image itself, such as those minors who had obviously 
not yet entered puberty. As one court explained, “[r]aising the age to eighteen enables 
enforcement . . . whenever the child depicted does not appear to be an adult.” United States 
v. Freeman, 808 F.2d 1290, 1293 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 112. See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 
3009-26 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–52, 2256 (2012)). Congress was worried that 
technological advancement would make it difficult for prosecutors to prove whether a 
particular image was an image of an actual child or whether it was a virtual creation. That 
worry appears to be well founded. See Timothy J. Perla, Note, Attempting to End the Cycle 
of Virtual Pornography Prohibitions, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1209, 1215 (2003). 
 113. 535 U.S. 234 (2002). The year after the Court’s decision in Free Speech Coalition, 
enforcement concerns led Congress to enact a narrower prohibition on the production, 
distribution, and possession of virtual child pornography. See Prosecutorial Remedies and 
Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 
Stat. 650 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B)) (providing for a new prohibition on the 
production, distribution, and possession of virtual child pornography that is 
“indistinguishable from” real pornography); see also Bell, supra note 15, at 1897–99; Perla, 
supra note 112, at 1214. While a few defendants have attempted to argue that this provision 
makes federal child pornography law overbroad, see, e.g., United States v. Payne, 519 F. 
Supp. 2d 466, 480–81 (D.N.J. 2007), aff’d, 394 F. App’x 891 (3d Cir. 2010); United States 
v. Sherr, 400 F. Supp. 2d 843, 848–49 (D. Md. 2005), as of December 1, 2013, I have not 
been able to locate a reported case in which a federal court has addressed the 
constitutionality of this new prohibition on virtual child pornography. 
 114. In response to the enforcement concerns that had been raised about virtual child 
pornography, the Free Speech Coalition Court stated: 
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word on prohibitions and enforcement. For example, as noted below, victims of 
morphed computer images could seek recourse through various tort doctrines,115 
and victims of surreptitious filming and photographs could be protected by criminal 
statutes prohibiting video voyeurism.116 In criminal trials, prosecutors may be able 
to rely on the obscenity exception to the First Amendment in cases if the 
circumstances of creation are unknown. The proposed definition affects only the 
categorical First Amendment exception for child pornography. It does not limit the 
exception for obscenity, and there is little doubt that many pornographic images 
that depict children are obscene.117 
                                                                                                                 
[T]he Government says that the possibility of producing images by using 
computer imaging makes it very difficult for it to prosecute those who produce 
pornography by using real children. Experts, we are told, may have difficulty in 
saying whether the pictures were made by using real children or by using 
computer imaging. The necessary solution, the argument runs, is to prohibit 
both kinds of images. The argument, in essence, is that protected speech may be 
banned as a means to ban unprotected speech. This analysis turns the First 
Amendment upside down. 
 The Government may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress 
unlawful speech. Protected speech does not become unprotected merely 
because it resembles the latter. The Constitution requires the reverse. 
535 U.S. at 254–55. That analysis applies equally to the proposed definition. If the main 
harm to be avoided through child pornography laws is the abuse and exploitation in creation, 
and if (as this Article argues) images created without such exploitation or abuse ought not be 
prohibited, then enforcement concerns ought not drive decisions about the scope of the 
constitutional category.  
 115. See infra text accompanying notes 241–44. 
 116. See infra note 263. 
 117. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 779 n.4 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (“The Senate Committee on the Judiciary concluded that ‘virtually all of the 
materials that are normally considered child pornography are obscene under the current 
standards,’ and that ‘[i]n comparison with this blatant pornography, non-obscene materials 
that depict children are very few and very inconsequential.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 
13 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 50)). Indeed, counsel for Ferber appears to 
have conceded at Supreme Court oral argument that the images at issue in that case were 
obscene. Schauer, supra note 26, at 290. 
  For an example of an obscenity prosecution for images created without the 
exploitation or abuse of children, see David Kravets, ‘Obscene’ U.S. Manga Collector Jailed 
6 Months, WIRED (Feb. 2, 2010, 5:14 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010
/02/obscene-us-manga-collector-jailed-6-months/. 
  Some prosecutors might hesitate to use the obscenity exception rather than the child 
pornography exception because the latter category has fewer limitations. For example, to 
prevail on an obscenity prosecution, a prosecutor will have to demonstrate that the image 
(a) when taken as a whole and applying contemporary community standards, appeals to the 
prurient interest; (b) depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, as determined by 
community standards; and (c) when taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). But these standards are likely met 
for many child pornography images. Indeed, images of children engaged in sexual activities 
may be more likely to be obscene than images of adults engaging in those same acts. 
  Prosecutors might also be concerned that they will be unable to prosecute possession 
cases. And as noted above, private possession of obscenity is protected under Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), while private possession of child pornography is not. 
2014] THE LIMITS OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 1461 
 
In short, although the proposed definition may make enforcement or prosecution 
more difficult, limiting the child pornography definition to images that are the 
product of exploitation or abuse appears to be the most defensible approach, and 
the costs such a definition may impose on criminal prosecutions are smaller than 
they first appear. 
B. The Harm of Circulation  
In addition to the harm of sexual exploitation and abuse in the creation of 
images, the harm most often discussed in the child pornography cases and 
academic literature is the harm of circulation.118 The harm of circulation is often 
characterized as a “continuing harm,” because the images “permanently record the 
victim’s abuse” and “haunt[] the children in years to come.”119  
The harm of circulation is distinct from the harm of creation.120 The harm of 
creation is the harm suffered by the child depicted at the time the image is created. 
The child suffers that harm because she is exploited or abused, and she suffers that 
harm independently from the creation of the image. Put differently, a child who is 
sexually assaulted or a child who is seduced into removing her clothes and posing 
in a sexually explicit manner is harmed regardless whether the moment is captured 
by a photograph (or on film). 
In contrast, the harm of circulation is the reputational and privacy harm suffered 
by the child when the image is viewed at a later time.121 As the Ferber Court tells 
                                                                                                                 
However, the protection afforded by Stanley is unlikely to be very robust in the internet age. 
Stanley protects only the private possession of obscenity; it does not protect against charges of 
distribution or receipt. See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 354–55 (1971); see also 
United States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326, 332 (4th Cir. 2008) (“Stanley’s holding was a narrow 
one, focusing only on the possession of obscene materials in the privacy of one’s home. The 
Court’s holding did not prohibit the government from regulating the channels of commerce. In 
an unbroken line of Supreme Court decisions since Stanley, the Court has repeatedly rejected 
the notion, urged by Whorley, that as a matter of logic, because the First Amendment prohibits 
the criminalization of private possession of obscene materials within the home, there exists a 
correlative ‘right to receive’ obscene materials.” (emphasis in original)). 
  That Stanley does not protect against distribution or receipt is of particular relevance 
after the advent of the internet because a person who possesses an image on his or her 
computer will in most circumstances have provided the government with sufficient evidence 
to charge that individual not only with possession but also with receipt. Specifically, the 
government can charge an individual who downloads a child pornography image from the 
internet with receiving that image—that is, taking possession of an object from another 
person—and with possessing that image on his or her computer. Indeed, a number of courts 
have recognized the overlap (and in some instances complete identity) of possession and 
receipt by dismissing child pornography charges under double jeopardy analysis. See, e.g., 
United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 71 n.15 (3d Cir. 2008). What is more, the same 
evidence that the government requires to prove possession—that is, the computer—will 
likely provide evidence of receipt via automatically stored electronic data. 
 118. See, e.g., Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 n.10 (quoting Shouvlin, supra note 42, at 545); 
Leary, supra note 71, at 528; Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 
PACE L. REV. 847, 853–54 (2008). 
 119. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990). 
 120. Rogers, supra note 90, at 37. 
 121. E.g., Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, § 121(1)(7), 110 
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us, the distribution of child pornography “violates ‘the individual interest in 
avoiding disclosure of personal matters.’”122 The fact that a child was sexually 
assaulted is a highly private matter. What a child looks like without her clothes is 
also highly personal. A child whose sexual exploitation or abuse was captured on 
film or in a photograph has her privacy violated each time that image is viewed by 
another individual, much as the publication of a defamatory statement causes harm 
each time it is published.123 
This concept of the harm of circulation suggests not only that the harm to a child 
depicted in child pornography is exacerbated by the existence of the image,124 but 
also that a child could suffer such harm even if the child suffered no abuse or 
exploitation in the creation of the image.125 For example, a minor who creates a 
sexually suggestive image of herself, without any prompting or suggestion by a 
third party, could nonetheless suffer harm if that image were subsequently 
distributed to others.126 Although the image was created without exploitation or 
abuse,127 some maintain that the image nonetheless constitutes child pornography 
because it is a depiction of sexual activity that involves a real child.128 
The harm of circulation, standing alone, should be insufficient to classify an 
image as child pornography. One reason to reject a circulation of harm definition 
for child pornography is that it would sweep far broader than what is permitted 
under Ferber and its progeny. For example, a definition based only on reputational 
harm need not be limited to visual depictions of minors engaged in sexual activity. 
If a written account of child sex abuse identified an actual minor—by name or 
physical description—that account would also cause reputational or emotional 
harm. Yet Ferber specifically stated that nonvisual depictions “retain[] First 
Amendment protection.”129 Reputational and emotional harm also occur upon the 
disclosure of facts surrounding all sexual activity, not simply those activities that 
are abusive or exploitative.130 
                                                                                                                 
Stat. 3009–26 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 note (2012)) (noting congressional finding that 
“child pornography which includes an image of a recognizable minor invades the child’s 
privacy and reputational interests, since images that are created showing a child’s face or other 
identifiable feature on a body engaging in sexually explicit conduct can haunt the minor for 
years to come”); Rogers, supra note 118, at 853 (“When the pornographic images are viewed 
by others, the children depicted are victimized once again.”). 
 122. 458 U.S. at 759 n.10 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977)).  
 123. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002) (“Like a defamatory 
statement, each new publication of the speech would cause new injury to the child’s 
reputation and emotional well-being.”); see also Rogers, supra note 118, at 862 (“[T]he 
possessor causes actual harm because re-publication inflicts shame and humiliation upon the 
child depicted.”). 
 124. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
 125. See, e.g., United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 728–29 (2d Cir. 2011); Rogers, 
supra note 90, at 16; Mazzone, supra note 92, at 173 n.32. 
 126. Leary, supra note 71, at 539–42. 
 127. This assumes, of course, that an individual cannot exploit herself. But see Leary, 
supra note 54 (advancing a theory of “self-exploitation”). 
 128. See, e.g., A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Leary, supra note 71. 
 129. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982). 
 130. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977) (“Sexual 
relations . . . are normally entirely private matters . . . .”). 
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Another reason to reject a harm of circulation definition for child pornography is 
that it is, in some respects, too narrow, and thus many child pornography 
prosecutions could not be justified on the basis of that harm. Children who are 
depicted but not identifiable—for example, because their faces are not included in 
the image—do not suffer the reputational or privacy harm associated with 
circulation. Yet there is little doubt that such pictures fall within the core of what 
has traditionally been considered child pornography. 
Prosecutions for private possession also cannot be justified based on the harm of 
circulation. The harm of circulation supports the prohibition of the production and 
distribution of child pornography because, as with defamatory statements, every 
distribution of child pornography causes new emotional and reputational harm to 
the child depicted.131 But the harm of circulation is absent in cases involving only 
private possession. The private possession of child pornography causes no new 
privacy or reputational harm to the victim,132 just as a person repeating a 
defamatory statement in an empty room causes no new reputational harm.133 
Of course, one could respond to the objection that this definition is too narrow 
by noting that a child pornography definition need not be based exclusively on the 
harm in circulation. Child pornography could be defined as an image that causes 
harm in creation or in circulation. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s repeated references 
to both the harm of creation and the harm of circulation could be read as endorsing 
such an alternative definition.134 But such a dual definition sweeps too broadly, 
extending the definition of child pornography beyond any salient differences 
between adults and children. First Amendment doctrine treats pornographic images 
very differently depending on whether those images depict adults or children.135 
Adults and children do not have significantly different privacy or reputational 
interests; they do, however, have meaningfully different concerns in the context of 
sexual activity. 
Imagine, for example, a thirteen-year-old girl and a thirty-year-old woman who 
live in the same house across the street from a peeping Tom. The peeping Tom 
surreptitiously watches the thirteen-year-old and the thirty-year-old through 
binoculars while they shower. Both the thirteen-year-old and the thirty-year-old 
have suffered a privacy invasion by being watched in the shower, and that harm is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 131. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249–50 (2002); United States v. 
Klug, 670 F.3d 797, 800 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 132. See infra text accompanying notes 232–34; cf. United States v. Laraneta, 700 F.3d 
983, 991 (7th Cir. 2012) (indicating that the harm caused by one person viewing an image of 
child pornography is significantly less than the harm caused by those who distribute the 
image), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 235 (2013). 
 133. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5:109, at 
748 (2d ed. 2012) (noting that a statement must be published to at least one other person in 
addition to the person defamed in order to establish a prima facie claim for defamation); see 
also supra note 22. 
 134. See supra notes 31–35, 41–42, 48–50 and accompanying text. 
 135. “Ferber involved a statutory scheme designed to protect children. The Court has 
often expressed its willingness to craft new and more deferential doctrine in approving such 
government action.” The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, supra note 26, at 147. 
1464 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:1437 
 
no different based on their age.136 Now imagine that, instead of simply watching 
the thirteen-year-old and the thirty-year-old while they are in the shower, the 
peeping Tom decides to ask the thirteen-year-old and the thirty-year-old to take off 
their clothes in front of him and pose for him to take photos. If the thirteen-year-old 
agrees, she has been sexually exploited. If the thirty-year-old agrees, we would not 
say that she has suffered harm, even if she later regrets that decision. Imagine the 
same scenario, but without the camera. Again, we would say that the 
thirteen-year-old suffered harm and the thirty-year-old did not. The distinction here 
is not the reputational harm; it is the ability to consent to sexual activity.137 
Some commentators have suggested that possession of child pornography cases 
are best justified by the harm of circulation.138 While the harm of circulation may 
be more apparent in possession cases than is the harm of creation, I do not mean to 
suggest that the proposed definition would prohibit prosecution in an ordinary 
possession of child pornography case. So long as the image possessed is the 
product of child sex exploitation or abuse, that prosecution would be permitted 
under the proposed definition.139 But if the image was created without exploitation 
or abuse, then as Part III explains in more detail, a prosecution for possession of 
child pornography would be prohibited. 
C. An “Integral Part” of an Illegal Course of Conduct 
In addition to a definition based on the harm in creation or the harm in circulation, 
one could attempt to define child pornography based on whether an image is “an 
integral part” of criminal conduct. Whether an image is “an integral part of conduct in 
violation of a valid criminal statute” is the definition of child pornography suggested 
                                                                                                                 
 
 136. One might argue that the peeping Tom has done something more reprehensible by 
spying on the thirteen-year-old than by spying on the thirty-year-old, or one might be 
concerned that the peeping Tom poses a risk of sexually assaulting a child based on his 
viewing of the thirteen-year-old rather than his viewing of the thirty-year-old. But those 
arguments are distinct from the harm suffered by the victims. 
 137. This example does not explain all differences between child pornography and 
obscenity. Imagine, for example, that instead of asking the thirteen-year-old and the 
thirty-year-old to pose for pictures, the peeping Tom rapes the thirteen-year-old and the 
thirty-year-old and photographs the rapes. There is no doubt that both the thirteen-year-old 
and the thirty-year-old suffered harm—they both suffered the harm of a sexual assault—yet 
only the pictures of the thirteen-year-old constitute illegal child pornography.  
  Even though both the thirteen-year-old and the thirty-year-old suffered harm, one 
could argue that the harm suffered by the thirteen-year-old is worse than that suffered by the 
thirty-year-old. Such an argument is supported by the relatively recent attempt by states to 
impose the death penalty for child rape. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 423 
(2008). Alternatively, one could argue that even if the thirteen-year-old and the 
thirty-year-old suffered equal amounts of harm, that similarity does not fully undermine the 
centrality of victim age in child pornography doctrine; that is because the pictures of the 
thirty-year-old are almost certainly illegal obscenity. 
 138. E.g., Rogers, supra note 118, at 853–54. 
 139. Notably, whether the image was, in fact, a product of exploitation or abuse may be 
contested as a factual matter. See supra text accompanying notes 111–17. 
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by the Court in United States v. Stevens.140 Stevens says that child pornography is but 
one manifestation of this “previously recognized, long-established category of 
unprotected speech.”141 One could read this language as suggesting that the child 
pornography exception to the First Amendment applies only if “there is specific 
illegal conduct to which the speech is integral.”142 
Defining child pornography as images that are “an integral part” of illegal 
conduct raises the question what constitutes “an integral part.” That question does 
not have an easy answer. Indeed, the case that first identified the “integral part” 
exception to the First Amendment, Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,143 did not 
clearly define the reach of the exception, nor have subsequent cases applying 
Giboney.144 
The “integral part” phrase could be read to define child pornography based on 
the illegality of the activity depicted.145 Such a reading would exclude images that 
depict “completely legal sexual acts.”146 But such a definition is at odds with the 
Court’s child pornography cases.147 Although the Court’s child pornography cases 
include references to the illegality of sexual exploitation and abuse that occurred 
during production,148 conduct need not be illegal in order to qualify as exploitative 
or abusive. Indeed, limiting the category of child pornography to images whose 
production involved not only sexual exploitation or abuse but also an independent 
criminal act is likely at odds with the holdings in Ferber and Osborne. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 140. 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Haynes, supra note 14, at 395. 
 143. 336 U.S. 490 (1949). 
 144. Volokh, supra note 79, at 1326. 
 145. See Haynes, supra note 14, at 373; see also Humbach, supra note 14, at 484–
85 (“Ashcroft strongly implies that the categorical exclusion should be limited to materials 
that are produced by means of criminal child abuse and exploitation.”). 
 146. Haynes, supra note 14, at 373–74. 
 147. What is more, as Frederick Schauer has noted, “material protected by the First 
Amendment does not shed that protection merely because it depicts or describes illegal 
activity.” Schauer, supra note 26, at 289.  
 148. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 250 (2002) (“In contrast to the 
speech in Ferber, speech that itself is the record of sexual abuse, the CPPA prohibits speech 
that records no crime and creates no victims by its production.”). Ferber suggests that the 
criminalization of child pornography distribution is permitted because the production of such 
images is illegal. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982). It is not clear, however, 
whether the Court is referring to the illegality of the actions underlying the creation of the 
image or whether it is simply relying on statutes aimed at the creation of child pornography. 
Compare id. at 761 n.13 (referring to “additional abuse of children” that will occur in “the 
process involved in developing” child pornography images (quoting H.R. 66-55686, Reg. Sess., 
at 132 (Tex. 1979); Judianne Densen-Gerber, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography: 
Medical, Legal, and Societal Aspects of the Commercial Exploitation of Children, in SEXUAL 
ABUSE OF CHILDREN: SELECTED READINGS 77, 80 (Barbara McComb Jones et al. eds., 1980)), 
and id. at 761–62 (referring to the general concept that the First Amendment does not protect 
“speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute” 
(quoting Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498)), with id. at 762 n.15 (referring to statutes outlawing the use 
of minors in the creation of pornographic materials).  
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Recall that the conviction affirmed in Ferber rested on films “depicting young 
boys masturbating.”149 There is no indication in the Court’s opinion that either 
masturbating or requesting that a minor masturbate was illegal in New York or in 
the jurisdiction where the films were produced.150 Similarly, the conviction 
affirmed in Osborne rested on “photographs” that depicted “a nude male adolescent 
posed in a sexually explicit position.”151 The Osborne opinion did not indicate that 
the photographs depicted activity that was, in the absence of the creation of an 
image, illegal. There is little doubt that, assuming an adult coerced or otherwise 
convinced the minors to pose for the films in Ferber or the photographs in 
Osborne, those minors were sexually exploited (as that term is defined in this 
Article).152 But it is unclear whether that exploitation would have been a crime if 
the minors had not been photographed or filmed. Indeed, because child 
pornography is sometimes distributed internationally, limiting the child 
pornography category to those images that capture activity that was illegal at the 
time and place of their creation would likely destroy the states’ ability to dry up the 
market.153 Thus, it seems safe to say that, references to illegality notwithstanding, 
the Supreme Court never intended to limit the constitutional category of child 
pornography based on “whether the production of the pornography involved some 
independent crime, such as child abuse.”154 
Looking at how the Court’s child pornography cases reference the “integral 
part” language underscores the unsuitability of using the phrase as a definition for 
child pornography. In Ferber and Osborne, for example, the Court explained that 
the targeted “conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute” was the production of 
child pornography.155 But that cannot serve as the definition for child pornography. 
Under that approach, the exception has no meaningful limit. The “integral part” 
exception would apply to the dissemination of speech simply by making it illegal to 
make a particular statement in the first instance.156  
In Stevens and Free Speech Coalition, the Court offered a different 
explanation—that the targeted “conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute” is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 149. 458 U.S. at 752. 
 150. See Humbach, supra note 14, at 468 (making this observation). 
 151. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 107 (1990). 
 152. See supra text accompanying notes 100–09. 
 153. See Humbach, supra note 14, at 469 (noting “possible legal status of such 
production in various foreign countries from which child pornography might be imported”). 
 154. Id. at 468. 
 155. Ferber makes this statement in connection with the following observation: 
[W]ere the statutes outlawing the employment of children in these films and 
photographs fully effective, and the constitutionality of these laws has not been 
questioned, the First Amendment implications would be no greater than that 
presented by laws against distribution: enforceable production laws would 
leave no child pornography to be marketed. 
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762 (1982). Osborne makes this statement in support of 
its conclusion that it is “surely reasonable for the State to conclude that it will decrease the 
production of child pornography if it penalizes those who possess and view the product, 
thereby decreasing demand.” 495 U.S. 103, 109–10. 
 156. Cf. Volokh, supra note 79, at 1315. 
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the abuse or exploitation that occurs in creating child pornography.157 Because 
child pornography creates a profit motive for the creation of images, and because 
images result from abuse or exploitation, child pornography is an “integral part” of 
the illegal activity that occurs at creation.158 This is perhaps the best interpretation 
of child pornography as “an integral part” of illegal conduct—namely that child 
pornography exists solely because a child was abused or exploited and that the 
child would not have been abused or exploited but for the desire to create child 
pornography.159  
But this definition of child pornography as “an integral part” of illegal conduct 
is still flawed. For one thing, even though it is framed as analysis about exploitation 
or abuse, it still suggests that the abuse or exploitation must be illegal independent 
of the creation of the image. As noted above, that analysis conflicts with the 
outcomes in Ferber and Osborne.160 This definition of child pornography is also at 
odds with other First Amendment cases.161 Those cases demonstrate that “not all 
speech that provides a motive for illegal conduct can be outlawed simply because it 
is ‘an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.’”162 Indeed, 
such reasoning would have prohibited publication in the Pentagon Papers case,163 
as well as other cases in which the Court has found First Amendment protection.164 
One could interpret the “integral part” language as prohibiting speech that helps 
or encourages the commission of a subsequent sex crime against a child.165 This 
approach would be consistent with the Court’s concern in Osborne that predators 
could use child pornography to seduce other children.166 But such a reading is also 
problematic. First, this definition was explicitly rejected in Free Speech 
Coalition.167 Second, such a definition would conflict with the First Amendment 
principle articulated in Brandenburg v. Ohio.168 Brandenburg held that speech 
helping or encouraging illegal behavior of others is protected unless the speech is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 157. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010); Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249–50 (2002). 
 158. See The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, supra note 26, at 147–48. 
 159. Cf. Schauer, supra note 26, at 300 (“Child pornography is an integral part of an 
illegal act in the sense that an illegal act gives rise to the communication and because the 
publication exists solely because there is an illegal act to portray.”). 
 160. See supra text accompanying notes 148–54. 
 161. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 162. Volokh, supra note 79, at 1325. 
 163. N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. 713. 
 164. See Schauer, supra note 26, at 300; Volokh, supra note 79, at 1325; see also Nadine 
Strossen, United States v. Stevens: Restricting Two Major Rationales for Content-Based 
Speech Restrictions, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 67, 86 (discussing Bartnicki v. Vopper). 
 165. See Volokh, supra note 79, at 1312 (noting that the “integral part” language from 
Giboney has been read to restrict speech that informs people how to violate the law when the 
speaker intends for the speech to help people commit crimes, and it has also been read to 
restrict speech that encourages the commission of a crime). 
 166. See supra text accompanying notes 53–54. 
 167. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 250 (2002). 
 168. 395 U.S. 444 (1969); see also Bell, supra note 15, at 1895. 
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both (a) intended to cause and (b) likely to cause imminent lawless conduct.169 
There is significant evidence that viewing child pornography does not cause 
individuals to engage in sexual contact with children.170 Thus the “integral part” 
language (as limited by Brandenburg) does not provide a rationale that permits an 
appropriate definition of child pornography. 
D. The Dost Test 
The definitions discussed in the preceding subparts rely on facts or 
circumstances surrounding the creation or circulation of an image. There is also a 
definition commonly employed by lower courts that looks only at the content of the 
image in question. This popular lower court test—the Dost test171—provides a 
standard for determining whether an image falls within the federal prohibition on 
the lascivious display of a minor’s genitals.172 The Dost test identifies six factors 
for courts to use in deciding whether an image constitutes a lascivious display of 
genitalia, that is, whether the content of an image constitutes child pornography: 
1) whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the child’s 
genitalia or pubic area; 2) whether the setting of the visual depiction is 
sexually suggestive, i.e., in a place or pose generally associated with 
sexual activity; 3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose, or 
in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child; 4) whether the 
child is fully or partially clothed, or nude; 5) whether the visual 
depiction suggests sexual coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual 
activity; 6) whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit 
a sexual response in the viewer.173 
Recall that my proposed definition has two components: (1) the depiction of 
sexual activity and (2) the circumstance that renders that activity exploitative or 
abusive.174 The Dost test distinguishes only between those instances of child nudity 
that satisfy the sexual activity component of sexual exploitation or abuse (that is, 
those images that depict a “lascivious exhibition” of the genitals) and those that do not.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 169. 395 U.S. at 447–49. 
 170. See Melissa Hamilton, The Child Pornography Crusade and Its Net-Widening 
Effect, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1679, 1694–716 (2012); Hessick, supra note 5, at 873–80; see 
also Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 250 (“While the Government asserts that the images can 
lead to actual instances of child abuse, the causal link is contingent and indirect. The harm 
does not necessarily follow from the speech, but depends upon some unquantified potential 
for subsequent criminal acts.” (citation omitted)). 
 171. The test was first articulated in United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 
1986), aff’d, 813 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1987) (unpublished table decision). 
 172. For a very persuasive critique of the Dost test, see Adler, Inverting, supra note 20. 
 173. Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 832. While the Dost test has been the subject of criticism, see 
United States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245, 250–52 (2d Cir. 2008) (collecting sources), it remains 
popular with lower courts, see Adler, Inverting, supra note 20, at 953 (“Virtually all lower 
courts that have addressed the issue have embraced the so-called ‘Dost test.’”). 
 174. See supra Part II.A. 
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The difference between the Dost test and my proposed definition is perhaps best 
illustrated by the first factor, “whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on 
the child’s genitalia or pubic area.”175 Whether the individual creating an image 
focuses his or her camera on the genitalia of the child depicted does not obviously 
change the experience of the child. Compare, for example, the films at issue in 
United States v. Johnson176 and United States v. Steen.177 Both cases involved 
defendants who filmed nude minors without their knowledge or permission.178 The 
minors filmed by both men experienced essentially the same harm—a privacy 
violation of which they were unaware at the time. Yet the two defendants were 
treated quite differently based on the content of the pictures that their relatively 
similar behavior yielded.179 The Steen court held that, because Steen’s camera 
captured an image that displayed the minor’s “pubic region” for approximately two 
seconds “on the far side of the image’s frame,” the first Dost factor was not 
satisfied and the image did not constitute child pornography.180 In contrast, the 
Johnson court remarked on the defendant’s use of the zoom feature on his camera 
and the “camera angle” when noting that “in many of the video clips . . . the frame 
encompassed [the minors’] nude bodies from their shoulders to below their 
knees.”181 The court apparently concluded that this satisfied the first Dost factor.182 
                                                                                                                 
 
 175. Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 832.  
 176. 639 F.3d 433 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 177. 634 F.3d 822 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 178. Johnson placed his camera on a shelf in an office where underage girls removed their 
clothing, 639 F.3d at 436; Steen placed his camera on the top of a partial wall in a tanning salon 
to film an underage girl in the next room as she removed her clothing, 634 F.3d at 824.  
  Although Johnson involved a conviction for attempted production of child 
pornography and Steen involved a conviction for the completed crime (rather than attempt), 
that distinction does not appear to have affected the courts’ analysis on the first Dost factor. 
 179. “[A] finding of graphic focus may depend on where a photographer aims his camera, 
making a determination of constitutional protection depend on what could be an accident of 
pictorial composition.” Adler, Perverse Law, supra note 20, at 239. Although these defendants’ 
actions were similar, it is possible to distinguish these two cases because the minors in the 
Johnson case were acting at the defendant’s direction, while the minor in the Steen case was 
not. See infra note 257. 
 180. Steen, 634 F.3d at 827. 
 181. 639 F.3d at 441. 
 182. Id. at 436–37, 440–41. As noted above, Johnson involved a conviction for attempt. 
The court explained: 
Eight video clips of two juvenile victims were shown to the jury. Many of these 
video clips showed the young women standing on the scale, and their nude bodies 
from about their shoulders to below their knees clearly appear. Their faces appear 
on screen only when they bend or stoop over to remove or put back on items of 
clothing. Other clips are more tightly focused, and in one of the clips, the 
camera’s focus has been so “zoomed in” that the left half of the female’s body 
from her left buttock down to her knee fills half of the screen. Had the female 
been facing the camera instead of away from it, a reasonable jury could have 
drawn a fair inference that the camera would have recorded a close-up view of her 
naked pubic area. Some of the clips clearly reveal the pubic areas of the young 
women not only as they stand on the scale facing the camera, but also as they go 
through the motions required to remove all of their clothing and put it back on. 
Id. at 436–37. 
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The “focal point” factor can also make subsequent editing or manipulation of an 
image highly relevant to the child pornography inquiry. A number of lower court 
decisions state that the cropping of images or focusing in on a specific area may be 
appropriately considered in the question of lasciviousness.183 For example, in 
United States v. Stewart,184 the defendant cropped pictures in such a way as to 
make the children’s genitalia the “focal point of the images.”185 Although the 
government conceded that the initial, larger images (photographs of young girls 
swimming naked at a beach) did not meet the definition of child pornography,186 
the court held that the defendant’s decision to crop the photographs rendered the 
new photographs lascivious and thus child pornography.187  
The sixth Dost factor—“whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to 
elicit a sexual response in the viewer”—also departs significantly from my 
proposed definition. That factor has sometimes been interpreted as speaking only to 
the content of an image.188 Other courts have interpreted the sixth factor to 
encompass an inquiry into the subjective thoughts of the creator or possessor, 
which can include an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the creation of the 
image.189  
One might argue that, because the sixth factor is framed in terms of the 
intentions of the person creating the image, this Dost factor could provide some 
information regarding the presence of sexual exploitation or abuse in production. 
Exploitation is an ambiguous concept, and whether the person who created the 
image “intended or designed” the image “to elicit a sexual response in the viewer” 
could help to distinguish between close cases. At the very least, it provides 
information about whether one person present at the creation of the image 
understood the circumstances of creation to be sexually charged. 
But that is not how many lower courts apply the sixth factor. The factor is 
phrased in the passive voice rather than explicitly in terms of the creator’s 
intentions. Perhaps because of this ambiguous phrasing, some courts have relied on 
the response of individuals who subsequently viewed the image in applying this 
                                                                                                                 
 
 183. E.g., United States v. Brown, 579 F.3d 672, 681 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Freeman, 808 F.2d 1290, 1292 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Dauray, 76 F. Supp. 2d 191, 
196–97 (D. Conn. 1999), rev’d, 215 F.3d 257 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 184. 839 F. Supp. 2d 914 (E.D. Mich. 2012), aff’d, 729 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 185. Id. at 923. 
 186. Id. at 922.  
 187. Id. at 923–24. Interestingly, the court appears to have believed that cropping was 
relevant to the sixth Dost factor. See id. at 923 (“The jury properly could infer that the image 
was intended to elicit a sexual response in the viewer because of how it was cropped and 
where it was located on the defendant’s computer.”).  
 188. See, e.g., United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117, 125 (3d Cir. 1989) (“We must . . . 
look at the photograph, rather than the viewer. If we were to conclude that the photographs 
were lascivious merely because [the viewer] found them sexually arousing, we would be 
engaging in conclusory bootstrapping rather than the task at hand—a legal analysis of the 
sufficiency of the evidence of lasciviousness.”). 
 189. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 579 F.3d 672, 683–84 (6th Cir. 2009) (adopting a 
“‘limited context’ test” that “permits consideration of the context in which the images were 
taken”); see also Adler, Inverting, supra note 20, at 954 n.149 (“Courts have wavered on the 
question of whether the focus must be on the audience, the photographer, or both.”). 
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factor.190 Whether someone derives sexual pleasure from a photograph does not 
retroactively create exploitation or abuse during the creation of the image.191 What 
is more, whether an individual finds an image arousing gives information about the 
sexual interests of that individual, not about whether the existence of the image 
ought to be forbidden.192 
And even assuming that the factor is evaluated only according to the creator’s 
intentions, whether the creator thought the image might evoke a sexual response in 
another person is irrelevant to whether the image itself actually does depict sexual 
activity.193 Prohibiting speech based on the feelings or thoughts that it provokes in 
others conflicts with the very core of First Amendment protection.194 United States 
v. Larkin195 illustrates this problem. That case involved five photographs that the 
defendant took of her five-year-old daughter. None of the five photographs focused 
on the child’s genitalia, and the court expressed skepticism that three of the photos 
could be characterized as depicting sexual activity.196 In deciding that the two 
remaining photographs did constitute child pornography, the court relied heavily on 
the sixth Dost factor. Although it questioned whether the first five Dost factors 
were sufficient for a finding of lasciviousness, the Larkin court relied on the fact 
that the defendant had sent the photograph to a known pedophile as evidence that 
the image was “intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer” and 
concluded that the image therefore constituted child pornography.197 
                                                                                                                 
 
 190. Adler, Inverting, supra note 20, at 957–60 (discussing State v. Dixon, 
No. 01C01-9802-CC-00085, 1998 WL 712344 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 1998), and 
United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 191. Cf. Villard, 885 F.2d at 125 (“Child pornography is not created when the pedophile 
derives sexual enjoyment from an otherwise innocent photo.” (quoting United States v. 
Villard, 700 F. Supp. 803, 812 (D.N.J. 1988))). 
 192. See United States v. Steen, 634 F.3d 822, 829 (5th Cir. 2011) (Higginbotham, J., 
concurring) (“A pedophile may be aroused by photos of children at a bus stop wearing 
winter coats, but these are not pornographic.”). 
 193. See Adler, Perverse Law, supra note 20, at 256–65 (critiquing the Dost test on 
similar grounds). 
 194. The ability to affect the thoughts or feelings of listeners is often referred to as 
“advocacy,” which the First Amendment undoubtedly protects. Even advocacy of the use of 
force or advocacy of violating the law is protected “except where such advocacy is directed 
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam); cf. Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253–54 (2002) (“The Government has shown no more than a 
remote connection between speech that might encourage thoughts or impulses and any 
resulting child abuse. Without a significantly stronger, more direct connection, the 
Government may not prohibit speech . . . .”).  
 195. 629 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 196. “Whether the images contained in the first three photographs depict ‘sexually 
explicit conduct’ is questionable. Because we hold that the visual depictions of B.L. 
contained in photographs four and five satisfy the definition contained in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2251(2)(B)(iii), it is unnecessary to determine whether the conduct captured in the first 
three photographs also falls within the statute’s ambit.” Id. at 185 n.7. 
 197. Id. at 182, 185. “We have the same concern with this photograph as we expressed in 
our analysis of photograph number five; standing alone, none of the identified Dost factors 
sufficiently demonstrate lasciviousness. But ‘given the particularities of the case,’ the 
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Undoubtedly, Larkin’s decision to send a photograph of her own daughter to an 
individual whom she knew as a pedophile is outrageous; it deserves strong 
condemnation, it should certainly result in the removal of the child from her care, 
and it should possibly result in other criminal charges. But Larkin’s subjective 
knowledge about the sexual preferences of the individual to whom she sent the 
photograph does not change the content of the picture itself. Yet that seems to be 
the conclusion that the Larkin court reaches. Were it not for Larkin’s knowledge of 
her intended viewer’s pedophilia and her decision to send him the photograph, the 
court signaled that it would not have classified the image as child pornography.198 
There is evidence indicating that some pedophiles prefer pictures of children that 
are innocent rather than sexual in nature, including images of children “doing 
gymnastics and twirling batons, playing in swimming pools and on playgrounds, or 
even pictures of children bundled up in heavy winter coats.”199 Under the reasoning 
in Larkin, application of the Dost test could result in a court finding that a picture 
of a child in a winter coat constitutes child pornography.200  
III. APPLYING THE PROPOSED DEFINITION 
One can easily see that the first case described in the Introduction falls outside 
the proposed definition. The fourteen-year-old New Jersey girl’s photos appear to 
have depicted sexual activity,201 but they do not appear to have been created under 
circumstances that rendered that activity exploitative or abusive. News accounts 
indicate that the girl posed for and created the photos without prompting by a third 
party; thus, the photographs were not the product of coercion.202 And even if the 
girl was too young to consent to sexual activity, the concept of consent (like any 
agreement) assumes two actors—the person seeking consent and the person giving 
consent. As explained above, a noncontact instance of sexual exploitation or abuse 
arises only when a minor engages in sexual activity because of a threat, request, or 
encouragement by another individual.203 It was the girl’s own idea to take these 
photos; thus, there was no exploitation or abuse. 
Although the proposed definition excludes many so-called teen sexting cases, it 
is probably unnecessary to redefine the child pornography exception in order to 
                                                                                                                 
presence of the sixth factor, which when coupled with the other factors, tips the scale in 
favor of categorizing the image as lascivious.” Id. at 185 (quoting United States v. Knox, 32 
F.3d 733, 747 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 198. See id. 
 199. Adler, Inverting, supra note 20, at 943–44; see also Adler, Perverse Law, supra note 
20, at 259–60. 
 200. See United States v. Brown, 579 F.3d 672, 683 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[I]f we frame the 
inquiry too broadly and place too much emphasis on the subjective intent of the 
photographer or viewer (in this case, the same person), a seemingly innocuous photograph 
might be considered lascivious based solely upon the subjective reaction of the person who 
is taking or viewing it.”); United States v. Amirault, 173 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(recognizing that if the focus of the inquiry is on an individual’s “subjective reaction” to a 
photograph, “a sexual deviant’s quirks could turn a Sears catalog into pornography”). 
 201. “Explicit” nude photos fall within the concept of sexual activity if they include a 
lewd or lascivious display of the genitals. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 202. See Girl Posts Nude Pics, supra note 1. 
 203. See supra text accompanying notes 100–06. 
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limit prosecution in only those cases. Teenage defendants have a strong statutory 
construction argument in sexting cases—namely, that their conduct almost 
certainly fell outside of what the legislature intended to capture when it 
criminalized the production, dissemination, and possession of child pornography.204 
Indeed, legislatures in several states have enacted statutes that deal specifically with 
teen sexting; the penalties associated with these statutes are significantly lower than 
those associated with child pornography.205 
Teen sexting, however, is not the only class of cases in which prosecutors have 
obtained child pornography convictions for images that are the product of neither 
                                                                                                                 
 
 204. See supra note 10. 
 205. See Shaaya, supra note 9, at 22–25 (collecting sources). For example, Nevada 
enacted a statute specifically aimed at sexting, which provides that a juvenile who 
“knowingly and willfully use[s] an electronic communication device to transmit or distribute 
a sexual image of himself or herself to another person” shall be classified as “a child in need 
of supervision” for the first offense and shall be adjudicated delinquent for a “second or a 
subsequent violation.” NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.737(1), (4) (LexisNexis 2012). The 
statute has similar provisions aimed at distribution and possession of sexting images. 
§ 200.737(2)–(3). The Nevada statute has a number of positive features. For one thing, the 
statute makes clear that sexting is a far less serious offense than the production of child 
pornography: a violation of the sexting statute results only in a finding that the child is in 
need of supervision, § 200.737(4), but a violation of the state statute criminalizing the 
production of child pornography is a category A felony punishable by up to life in prison, 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 200.710, 200.750 (LexisNexis 2012). Moreover, the statute 
specifically exempts juveniles from registration and community notification requirements 
that otherwise apply to sex offenders and those convicted of child pornography offenses. 
§ 200.737(4)(a)(2). 
  But Nevada’s legislation does not go far enough. In particular, the state did not 
amend its general child pornography production laws to exempt juveniles from prosecution 
under the general (and more serious) child pornography statute. § 200.710 (defining the 
offense in terms of whether it has been committed by “a person” and making no mention of 
age). Such a statutory scheme permits prosecutors to choose whether to charge teens under 
the new sexting statute or under the broader child pornography statute. See Jennifer D. Hill, 
The Teen Sexting Dilemma: A Look at How Teen Sexting Has Been Treated in the Criminal 
Justice System and Suggested Responses for Arizona, 4 PHOENIX L. REV. 561, 593 (2010) 
(Proposed sexting legislation in Arizona “does not remove the possibility that a prosecutor 
may use Arizona’s child pornography laws to charge teens who are engaged in sexting. Even 
though it gives prosecutors and law enforcement officials the option of charging teens with 
lesser offenses, it does not change or amend the definition of child pornography.”); cf. 
Nelson v. State, 612 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (allowing a defendant to be 
prosecuted for rape instead of incest when he violated both statutes). In contrast, Utah 
amended its general law on the distribution of pornographic materials to distinguish between 
offenders based on their age, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1204 (LexisNexis 2012), and 
Nebraska created an age-based affirmative defense to child pornography charges, NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 28-813.01(3) (LexisNexis 2009). 
  Of course, if sexting images do not fall within the constitutional category of child 
pornography, one might ask why states ought to be able to prohibit minors from creating, 
distributing, and possessing such images. The answer lies in the state’s ability to regulate 
minors differently than adults. See generally Carissa Byrne Hessick & Judith M. Stinson, 
Juveniles, Sex Offenses, and the Scope of Substantive Law, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 5 (2013). 
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child sex abuse nor child sex exploitation. This Part applies the proposed definition 
to three additional scenarios: (a) images that depict a minor above the age of 
consent, (b) images created through computer morphing, and (c) images that result 
from surreptitious filming or photographing. These applications demonstrate how 
the proposed definition would change the scope of the child pornography 
exception. While each of these categories of cases has been classified as child 
pornography under current doctrine, all are excluded from the child pornography 
exception under the proposed definition. 
Before turning to the applications, it is worth noting the legal implications of 
excluding these categories of cases from the definition of child pornography. Not 
only would the proposed definition prohibit the prosecution of the individuals who 
create the images, it would also prohibit the prosecution of subsequent individuals 
who distribute or possess the images. Put another way, by limiting the child 
pornography exception to those images which are the product of exploitation or 
abuse, the images described below would no longer be child pornography, as a 
matter of law, and neither the creators nor the downstream consumers of those 
images could be prosecuted under child pornography laws.206 
A. Age of Consent 
Our first application of the proposed definition (and likely the least controversial 
application) is drawn from United States v. Bach.207 The defendant in that case 
challenged his conviction for producing child pornography. The images he created 
depicted a sixteen-year-old boy masturbating and engaging in oral sex with the 
defendant.208 Bach argued that these images could not be punished as illegal child 
pornography because they “portray[ed] noncriminal consensual sexual conduct.”209 
The age of consent in both the state where the images were created (Minnesota) and 
under federal law is sixteen, and the minor depicted was sixteen.210 
The Eighth Circuit rejected Bach’s argument. Although federal law (and many 
state laws) sets the age of consent for sexual activity below eighteen, the court 
found no problem with a legislative decision to set the age of a minor for child 
pornography purposes higher than the age of consent for sexual relations.211 But the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 206. That does not mean the images would necessarily be protected by the First 
Amendment. Other First Amendment exceptions, such as certain tort doctrines, may permit 
some amount of regulation or recovery. See infra text accompanying notes 241–44, 263–66. 
 207. 400 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 208. Id. at 628. 
 209. Id. As the facts from Bach indicate, age of consent cases represent a larger category of 
cases than teen sexting cases. Although teen sexting prosecutions sometimes involve 
adolescents who are above the age of consent, the images in those cases are self-produced. In 
contrast, age of consent cases may involve images that are created by the minor depicted or by 
another individual (as was the case in Bach). 
 210. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.342 et seq. (West 2003); 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (2000)). 
 211. The Bach court reasoned: 
The First Amendment does not prevent prosecution for child pornography, and 
Congress may regulate pornography involving all minors under the age of 
eighteen if it has a rational basis for doing so. Congress changed the definition 
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Bach Court (and other courts that have confronted this issue212) did not grapple 
with the fact that the Supreme Court’s decision to exempt child pornography from 
First Amendment protection was based largely on the sexual exploitation and abuse 
suffered by the children depicted. Because the sixteen-year-old depicted in these 
images was above the age of consent, and because there is no indication that the 
sexual activity in which he engaged was the product of force or coercion, he did not 
suffer abuse or exploitation. Criminalizing pornographic images of adolescents who 
are above the age of consent but below the age of eighteen does not further the state 
interest in preventing exploitation and abuse. It only furthers the lesser and derivative 
interest in protecting those adolescents from the harms associated with circulation.213 
Generally speaking, a law that infringes or coerces speech may be constitutional 
only if it satisfies strict scrutiny—that is, the law must be narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling government interest.214 Criminalizing pornographic images of 
adolescents who are above the age of consent arguably fails both prongs of the 
strict scrutiny requirement. As explained in more detail above,215 the harms 
associated with circulation are not nearly as serious as the harms associated with 
sexual exploitation or abuse. The disparity between the two types of harms is so 
                                                                                                                 
of minor in the child pornography laws in 1984 to apply to anyone under 
eighteen. It found that the previous ceiling of sixteen had hampered 
enforcement of child pornography laws. With that ceiling there was sometimes 
confusion about whether a subject was a minor since children enter puberty at 
differing ages. We conclude that the congressional choice to regulate child 
pornography by defining minor as an individual under eighteen is rationally 
related to the government’s legitimate interest in enforcing child pornography 
laws . . . . 
Id. at 629 (citations omitted). 
 212. See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 808 F.2d 1290, 1292–93 (8th Cir. 1987); United 
States v. Crane, No. 1:07-CR-408-TWT, 2008 WL 5075906, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 25, 2008); 
United States v. Shreck, No. 03-CR-0043-CVE, 2006 WL 2945368, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 
13, 2006); United States v. Sherr, 400 F. Supp. 2d 843, 849–50 (D. Md. 2005); United States 
v. Ortiz-Graulau, 397 F. Supp. 2d 345, 347–48 (D.P.R. 2005), aff’d, 526 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 
2008); Cochran v. State, 111 So. 3d 148, 156–58 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012); People v. 
Campbell, 94 P.3d 1186, 1189–90 (Colo. App. 2004); People v. Hollins, 971 N.E.2d 504, 
509–11 (Ill. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 581 (2012); State v. Senters, 699 N.W.2d 810, 
816–18 (Neb. 2005); State v. Hughes, 261 P.3d 1067, 1070 (Nev. 2011); see also State v. 
Parker, 147 P.3d 690, 697–98 (Alaska 2006) (addressing the issue in the context of an 
argument for sentencing leniency). 
 213. At least one court has held that the limited interest is sufficient to prohibit the 
creation of such images. See A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 238–39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2007). 
 214. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715–17 (1977). But see Schauer, supra note 
18, at 1768 (“[E]ven the briefest glimpse at the vast universe of widely accepted 
content-based restrictions on communication reveals that the speech with which the First 
Amendment deals is the exception and the speech that may routinely be regulated is the 
rule.”); James Weinstein, A Brief Introduction to Free Speech Doctrine, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
461, 468 (1997) (“So many people, including some who should know better, seem to think 
that [First Amendment protection] applies generally to all speech. Manifestly, however, a 
rule forbidding government from regulating the content of speech cannot—and does not —
apply to all human utterances regardless of the setting.”). 
 215. See supra text accompanying notes 88–94. 
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great that a court might conclude that the government interest in preventing 
circulation—especially circulation to which the adolescent initially agrees—is not a 
compelling interest. What is more, most American jurisdictions currently prohibit 
private creation and possession of such images, even though neither of these 
activities implicates the harms of circulation or the harms of creation. This seems to 
run afoul of the narrowly tailored requirement.216 
Although courts have repeatedly rejected challenges to child pornography 
convictions based on age of consent arguments,217 those decisions do not subject the 
laws as applied to the particular defendants to First Amendment analysis. Instead, 
courts assess the bare rationality of whether “there are rational, reasonable arguments 
in support of having a higher age threshold for appearance in pornography than for 
consent to sexual activity.” Some courts opine that the “dangers of appearing in 
pornographic photographs or videos are not as readily apparent and can be much 
more subtle” than the dangers of sexual activity.218 Others note that classifying all 
sexually explicit images depicting adolescents under eighteen as child pornography 
furthers enforcement efforts because of the difficulty associated with determining the 
age of an adolescent from a picture.219 While this analysis may be relevant to whether 
a state may prohibit adolescents under the age of eighteen from participating in the 
creation of pornographic images,220 it does not answer the question whether the 
resulting images are unprotected speech. The prohibition and punishment of speech 
must be analyzed under the First Amendment. 
B. Morphed Computer Images 
Our second application of the proposed definition is drawn from United States v. 
Hotaling.221 The defendant in that case was convicted of possessing child 
pornography based on his creation of morphed computer images; in particular, he 
digitally “cut” the heads of minor females from nonpornographic photographs and 
superimposed those heads onto images of adult females engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct.222  
Under the proposed definition, the images that the Hotaling defendant created 
fall outside the constitutional limits of child pornography. A morphed computer 
image begins with an innocent image of a minor—that is, an image that no one 
would claim is child pornography, such as an image of a fully clothed child riding a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 216. See Senters, 699 N.W.2d at 817–18 (noting and rejecting the defendant’s argument 
under a rational basis standard but observing that it might succeed under strict scrutiny). 
 217. See supra note 212. 
 218. People v. Hollins, 971 N.E.2d 504, 511 (Ill. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 581 (2012). 
For similar analysis, see People v. Campbell, 94 P.3d 1186, 1189–90 (Colo. App. 2004). 
 219. United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 629 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Freeman, 
808 F.2d 1290, 1292–93 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 220. See, e.g., A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
 221. 634 F.3d 725 (2d Cir. 2011).  
 222. Id. at 727. While the facts indicate that the defendant not only possessed these 
images but also created them, the government appears to have agreed to charge him with 
only possession (and not production) in return for a guilty plea. 
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bicycle.223 Technology is then used to change the innocent image and make it 
appear as though the child is naked or engaged in a sex act. While the morphed 
image makes it appear as though the child is being sexually exploited or abused, the 
child never actually suffers such abuse.224 Put simply, morphed computer images 
involve no sexual exploitation or abuse of children in the production process, and 
thus they do not fall within the proposed definition of child pornography. 
The defendant in Hotaling raised an as-applied challenge to the statute under 
which he was convicted, arguing that because “no actual minor was harmed or 
exploited by the creation of the photographs,” the images were protected by the 
First Amendment.225 The Second Circuit rejected this argument, noting that Ferber 
recognized the harm to minors not only in the creation of child pornography but 
also in the circulation of the images.226 “These emotional and reputational harms” 
associated with circulation of images are, according to the Second Circuit, “severe 
enough to render laws criminalizing the possession of child pornography 
constitutional.”227 Relying on United States v. Williams and Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coalition, the Second Circuit framed its “underlying inquiry” as “whether 
an image of child pornography implicates the interests of an actual minor.”228 In 
particular, the Second Circuit relied on the passage from Free Speech Coalition in 
which the Supreme Court noted that “[a]lthough morphed images may fall within 
the definition of virtual child pornography, they implicate the interests of real 
children and are in that sense closer to the images in Ferber.”229 
The Hotaling court was not alone in deciding that morphed computer images 
constitute child pornography.230 But not all lower courts to consider the issue have 
categorized morphed computer images as child pornography.231 The Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 
 223. Using terms such as “innocent images” as placeholders for the concept of non–child 
pornography is commonplace in the literature. Of course, distinguishing between those 
images that are and are not child pornography is often highly contested. So using the term 
“innocent images” sidesteps the disagreement over what constitutes child pornography. See 
Adler, Perverse Law, supra note 20, at 239 n.168. 
 224. Of course, if the image was created by “pasting” the head of a minor from an 
innocent photo onto the body of a child from an existing image of child pornography, e.g., 
Bach, 400 F.3d at 625, then the resulting morphed image ought to be classified as child 
pornography. That is because the morphed image is still the product of sexual exploitation or 
abuse—not the exploitation or abuse of the minor from the innocent image but of the minor 
from the preexisting child pornography image. See id. at 632. 
 225. 634 F.3d at 727. 
 226. Id. at 728 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 n.10 (1982)). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 729. 
 229. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 242 
(2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also supra text accompanying notes 61–62. 
 230. See United States v. Ramos, 685 F.3d 120, 134 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 567 (2012); see also Doe v. Boland, 630 F.3d 491, 497 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 231. See People v. Gerber, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 688, 701 (Ct. App. 2011) (applying doctrine 
of constitutional avoidance in morphed image case and noting that “the articulated rationales 
underlying both the Ferber and Free Speech Coalition decisions compel the conclusion that 
such altered materials are closer to virtual child pornography than to real child pornography 
since the use of photo editing software to replace an adult’s head with a child’s head on 
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of New Hampshire, for example, overturned a child pornography conviction based 
on morphed computer images “that depict heads and necks of identifiable minor 
females superimposed upon naked female bodies” but where “the naked bodies do 
not depict body parts of actual children engaging in sexual activity.”232 The court 
rested its decision on the conclusion that “when no part of the image is ‘the product 
of sexual abuse,’ and a person merely possesses the image, no demonstrable harm 
results to the child whose face is depicted in the image.”233 While holding that a 
conviction based on possession of such images violated the First Amendment 
because no children were harmed in the production of the images, the court left 
open the possibility that a conviction involving distribution might not raise the 
same constitutional concerns because circulation of such images could harm the 
minor.234 
Put simply, in holding that morphed computer images constitute child 
pornography, lower courts have relied on the harm of circulation. Even the harm of 
circulation, however, has become unmoored from its analytical foundations. As 
noted above, the harm of circulation is a privacy or reputational harm akin to the 
harms of defamation, invasion of privacy, or false light invasion of privacy.235 The 
conceptual foundation of this harm relies on the distribution of an image to other 
individuals, just as reputation and privacy torts require publication.236 But in cases 
involving morphed computer images, courts have stated that children suffer harm 
even when there is no subsequent distribution. As one district court put it, “there is 
also harm to the child in his or her objectification by a single viewer”—in that case, 
the viewer was also the creator of the image—“of his or her images of unintended 
                                                                                                                 
pornographic images of the adult does not necessarily involve sexual exploitation of an 
actual child. Although we may find such altered images morally repugnant, we conclude that 
mere possession of them remains protected by the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.”); see also Parker v. State, 81 So. 3d 451, 452–53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) 
(holding that manual cutting and pasting of photographs of children’s heads onto sexually 
explicit images featuring adults did not meet the state statutory definition of child 
pornography); Stelmack v. State, 58 So. 3d 874, 874–75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (same). 
 232. State v. Zidel, 940 A.2d 255, 265 (N.H. 2008). 
 233. Id. at 263 (citation omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 
249 (2002)). 
 234. Id. at 264–65; see also Gerber, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 701 n.5 (“We do not reach the 
question whether criminal liability may be imposed, consistent with the First and Fourteenth 
Amendment, upon individuals that knowingly distribute, publish, or exhibit depictions of 
sexual conduct produced by computer editing of adult pornographic images using images of 
a real child where those actions invade the privacy interests of the minor . . . .” (emphasis in 
original)). 
 235. See supra text accompanying notes 121–23; see also Child Pornography Prevention 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121(1)(7), 110 Stat. 3009-26 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2251 note (2012)) (“[T]he creation or distribution of child pornography which includes an 
image of a recognizable minor invades the child’s privacy and reputational interests, since 
images that are created showing a child’s face or other identifiable feature on a body 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct can haunt the minor for years to come.”). 
 236. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 133, §§ 5:109, 5:114 (noting that publication is an 
essential element of defamation and the “false light” tort). But see id. § 5:87 (noting that 
publication is not an essential element of the invasion of privacy by “intrusion” tort).  
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intimacy.”237 The Hotaling court identified the “psychological harm of knowing 
that their images were exploited . . . by a trusted adult.”238 The precise nature of 
this harm is unclear. Is it the discomfort or revulsion the child feels upon learning 
of the images?239 That harm seems much less pressing than and far removed from 
the mental and emotional harm a child might experience from having a “permanent 
record” of his or her sexual abuse viewed by countless individuals.240 
Excluding morphed images from the constitutional category of child 
pornography does not mean that individuals are always free to create and distribute 
such images. Nor does it mean that a child depicted in such images will have no 
legal recourse. For example, if an individual creates morphed sexually explicit 
images of an actual child and profits from the sale or distribution of those images, 
the child may be able to recover damages for the misappropriation of her image.241 
Even if the images are distributed without profit, the child may be able to recover 
                                                                                                                 
 
 237. United States v. Stewart, 839 F. Supp. 2d 914, 925 (E.D. Mich. 2012), aff’d, 729 
F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 238. United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 730 (2d Cir. 2011). The Hotaling court also 
identified the harm to the children in the morphed computer images as “risk of reputational 
harm.” The court based its conclusion about the risk of reputational harm on the fact that the 
images were labeled and formatted in ways that would have facilitated distribution (though 
there was no evidence or allegation of distribution). Id. at 727, 729–30. 
 239. This particular harm seems dependent upon children learning about that the images 
exist. Yet courts have stated that children suffer harm even if they never see or learn about 
the images. See Lora v. Boland, 825 F. Supp. 2d 905, 908 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (stating that the 
minors in computer-morphed images were harmed by the existence of the pictures even 
though they had never seen or learned about the images), aff’d sub nom. Doe v. Boland, 698 
F.3d 877 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2825 (2013). 
 240. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982) (“[P]hotographs and films 
depicting sexual activity by juveniles . . . are a permanent record of the children’s [sexual 
abuse].”). In addition to the harm of circulation, Congress has identified other harms caused 
by images created without exploitation or abuse—namely, that “child pornography is often 
used as part of a method of seducing other children into sexual activity”; that “child 
pornography is often used by pedophiles and child sexual abusers to stimulate and whet their 
own sexual appetites, and as a model for sexual acting out with children”; and that “any form 
of child pornographic images has a deleterious effect on all children by encouraging a 
societal perception of children as sexual objects and leading to further sexual abuse and 
exploitation of them.” Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 § 121(1)(3), (4), (11)(A). 
Aside from the mention in Osborne about protecting future child abuse victims, see supra 
note 53 and accompanying text, the Court has not incorporated these concerns in its child 
pornography jurisprudence. 
 241. See, e.g., Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1138 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(affirming jury finding of violation of the “commercial-appropriation branch of the right of 
privacy” against “provocative” magazine that published nude photos of plaintiff without her 
consent); Coton v. Televised Visual X-Ography, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1303, 
1313 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (acknowledging a common law misappropriation of image tort in 
case involving unauthorized use of plaintiff’s image on the packaging of defendant’s 
pornographic DVD); Clark v. Celeb Publ’g, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 979, 983–84 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(awarding damages to a model whose photographs were used in a pornographic magazine 
without her authorization). See generally William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 
383, 401–07 (1960) (discussing appropriation). 
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for false light invasion of privacy242 or perhaps for defamation.243 These tort claims 
will allow children to recover if their images are distributed but do not appear to 
provide relief for the mere creation or private possession of such images.244 
Importantly, the fact that a child depicted in a morphed computer image may 
have legal recourse does not suggest that the child pornography question is merely 
one of labeling. Permitting a child to recover damages under a tort theory indicates 
that First Amendment rights in morphed computer images are not absolute. But a 
judicial finding that a morphed image was actionable under the false light tort or as 
defamation would not have the same legal implications as a determination that such 
an image was child pornography. Private possession of child pornography images 
can be criminalized, for example, while private possession of defamatory or 
misleading images cannot.245 
C. Surreptitious Photographs and Films 
Our third application of the proposed definition involves surreptitious 
photographs or films. A case involving surreptitious photographing or filming is a 
case in which an image depicting a minor engaging in sexual activity was created 
without the minor’s knowledge and without the producer’s manipulation of the 
minor’s activities. Under the proposed definition, these images do not fall within 
the child pornography category. 
United States v. Klug246 provides an example of a surreptitious filming case. 
Klug was charged with producing child pornography based on his surreptitious 
filming of boys he supervised on camping trips and boys he encountered in the 
locker room of his health club. During the camping trips, Klug “had hidden a 
camera in his backpack to film boys showering,” and once he “used a hidden 
camera to film a boy changing clothes while in a tent; this filming also happened to 
record the boy masturbating.”247 There was no evidence that the defendant had 
influenced or directed the boys he filmed; rather the evidence demonstrated only 
that Klug had hidden cameras and that those cameras had captured images of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 242. “Invasion of privacy by ‘false light’ involves a publication which places plaintiff in 
a false light highly offensive to a reasonable person.” 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 133, 
§ 5:112; see also Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1138 (affirming false light claim against 
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 244. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 133, § 5:114, at 768 (“[T]he false light tort requires 
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 245. Cf. supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 246. 670 F.3d 797 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 247. Id. at 798. 
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boys while nude and engaged in sexual activity (namely, masturbation and 
lascivious exhibition of the genitals).248 
In support of his argument that he should have received a lower sentence, Klug 
maintained on appeal that “no harm came to the children he filmed because there 
was no sexual contact.”249 He contrasted the images he produced with images of 
“hardcore pornography that depict[] children being raped by adults or engaged in 
explicit sexual activity with other children,” and he argued that the images he 
created ought to result in a less severe punishment than such hardcore images.250 
The Seventh Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument, noting that “child 
pornography is pernicious precisely because the harm it produces is not limited to 
the sexual abuse it depicts”; child pornography also causes “distinct and serious 
harm” to the minors depicted by “giving their images a permanent existence and 
the potential for endless replication, all of which is beyond the control of the 
victims.”251 Other courts have also permitted child pornography convictions on the 
basis of surreptitious films or photographs.252 
The proposed definition would exclude surreptitious photographing and filming 
from the constitutional definition of child pornography. Under the proposed 
definition, the manner in which an image is produced is essential in assessing 
whether it is appropriately classified as child pornography.253 In situations like Klug, 
the child depicted is neither abused nor exploited in the creation of the image.254  
One might argue that these children have been exploited because the images 
were created without the children’s consent. As noted above, lack of consent is one 
feature of sexual exploitation.255 If a child is photographed or filmed without her 
knowledge, then the image was necessarily created without her consent. But the 
lack of consent must relate not only to the creation of the image but also to the 
activity depicted.256 The children in Klug were showering and masturbating of their 
own accord; the defendant did not, for example, request or encourage a boy to 
masturbate in front of him and then film the boy without his knowledge.257 That 
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 249. Id. at 800. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 639 F.3d 433, 435 (8th Cir. 2011); United States 
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 255. See supra text accompanying notes 100–06. 
 256. See supra Part II.A. 
 257. The facts in Johnson present a close case under this standard. In that case, the 
defendant, a weightlifting coach, moved a scale into a small examining room and then hid a 
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weigh themselves. Johnson, 639 F.3d at 436. 
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alternative factual scenario would meet the proposed standard because the producer 
would have manipulated the victim into engaging in sexual activity,258 activity to 
which the boy could not consent. In contrast, where the producer acts as “a sort of 
‘peeping Tom’ catching children at intimate moments and exposing them for the 
world to see,”259 the resulting image is not a record of abuse or exploitation.260 
There is no doubt that a child who is surreptitiously filmed while showering or 
masturbating has suffered a serious invasion of privacy. But an invasion of privacy 
is a harm that is different in kind from sexual abuse or exploitation. A similar 
privacy invasion could occur in the absence of a visual depiction, such as in the 
peeping Tom example discussed above.261 A reputational harm could occur without 
a visual depiction, such as in the publication of the name of a victim of child sex 
abuse. And the harm associated with the wide circulation of an image that is 
outside of an individual’s control could occur in the absence of sexual activity. 
Consider, for example, the bullying and mental anguish that the so-called Star Wars 
Kid experienced after an embarrassing video of him mock “lightsaber” fighting was 
widely publicized and circulated.262 
Of course, the mere fact that images created through surreptitious photographing 
or filming do not fall within the limits of child pornography does not mean there is 
no legal recourse against those who have created these images. Alternative methods 
could be used to prosecute those who create such images and to compensate those 
children whose privacy has been violated. For example, some jurisdictions 
criminalize so-called “video voyeurism,” which includes surreptitious 
photographing or filming not only of children but also of adults.263 Many 
jurisdictions recognize the invasion of privacy tort, which would allow victims to 
recover damages when such a surreptitious image is created.264 The disclosure of 
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private facts tort may allow victims to recover when such an image is distributed.265 
But, as noted above, the fact that criminal or civil charges may prevail in cases 
involving surreptitious filming or photographing does not have the same legal 
implications as a determination that the filming or photographing produced child 
pornography.266 
CONCLUSION 
The First Amendment protects speech except in limited circumstances. Child 
pornography is one category of speech to which the Supreme Court has denied 
protection. In creating a categorical exception to free speech, however, the Court has 
failed to provide a clear definition of child pornography. In the absence of 
constitutional limits, prosecutors and lower courts have expanded the category to 
include images that were created without any sexual abuse or exploitation of a child. 
This Article makes the case for limiting child pornography to those images that 
are the product of child sex exploitation or abuse. Not only is there support for such 
a definition in the Court’s child pornography cases, but this definition most 
logically supports the differing treatment of child and adult pornography. 
Providing meaningful limits on child pornography is important not only because 
of the occasional prosecutorial abuse that makes headlines267—such as teen sexting 
cases268—but also because child pornography laws are being used as a proxy to 
punish child sex abuse.269 Many judges state that they are putting child 
pornography offenders in prison to protect children,270 and law enforcement 
officials regularly tout their child pornography arrests and convictions as success in 
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their efforts to prevent child sex abuse.271 There is continuing disagreement over 
the social science evidence tying the possession of child pornography to contact sex 
offenses against children.272 But there is no doubt that the First Amendment leeway 
legislators and law enforcement have enjoyed with respect to child pornography is 
founded on the compelling interest of protecting children from child sex abuse and 
exploitation.  
When there is no link between an image and such exploitation or abuse, 
ordinary First Amendment principles ought to apply. 
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